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THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JUDGE
LEARNED HAND: What Endures and Why?
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.*
The 100th anniversary of Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten' invites us to look back on its author's long career
and to consider his contributions to American law and his significance in the
nation's history. Spanning more than fifty years from the presidency of
William Howard Taft to the presidency of John F. Kennedy, Hand's judicial
career presents an exceptionally rich subject for such reflection.
INTRODUCTION
As Gerald Gunther's massive biography2 and Constance Jordan's edition
of his letters3 make clear, Learned Hand's life merits scholarly attention for
any number of reasons. An unusual personal psychology, friendships with
major historical figures, social and political involvements, extensive law
reform efforts, highly regarded essays and speeches, insightful and
controversial ideas about democracy, and valuable contemporaneous
commentaries on the people and events of his day all warrant general
interest.4 In revealing ways Hand's life and activities track the course of the
nation's history through the first half of the twentieth century. Richard Posner
surely betrayed the narrowest of professional, and perhaps judicial,
* Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. I thank the participants
in this symposium for comments on a shorter oral presentation and my colleagues at the New
York Law School Faculty Colloquium for comments on an earlier and much longer version of
this paper. I also thank Jethro K. Lieberman for his careful reading, Michael McCarthy for his
invaluable help in obtaining source material, and research assistants Hyun-Soo Lim at the Yale
Law School and Daniel Martorelli at New York Law School for their research assistance.
1. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
2. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
3. REASON AND IMAGINATION: THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF LEARNED HAND:
1897 1961 (Constance Jordan ed., 2013).
4. As Kathryn Griffith showed more than forty years ago, for example, Hand deserves
serious attention as a theorist of democracy. See KATHRYN GRIFFITH, JUDGE LEARNED HAND AND
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 119,201 27 (1973).
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viewpoints when he declared that it "is only by virtue of his work as a lower-
court judge that Hand merits a biography."5
Still, Posner was right in pointing to Hand's judicial career as the most
obvious, and surely most widely recognized, basis for his claim to historical
importance.6 From 1909 to 1924 Hand served as a judge in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and from 1924 to his
death in 1961 he was a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. On the latter bench, he served for twelve years as Chief Judge
and for the last ten years as a "retired" judge who nonetheless continued to
hear cases. Most important, with near unanimity his peers proclaimed him
one of America's greatest judges.8 "Learned Hand's opinions are the best
Federal Court opinions that come before us for review," Justice Louis D.
Brandeis wrote.9 Judge Charles E. Wyzanski declared that Hand was "the
master craftsman of our calling,"'" and Judge Henry Friendly agreed. "No
oracular gifts are required," he believed, "for the prophecy that when the
history of American law in the first half of this [twentieth] century comes to
5. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 Yale L.J. 511, 532 (1994) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE
MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)). Posner continued: "and neither his neurotic personality nor his
constitutional view are either terribly interesting or explain his judicial performance." Id.
6. "The most important ingredient of Hand's mounting renown was clearly his work on
the bench." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 345.
7. Id. at 503, 639.
8. "During the last twenty-five years of his life [Hand] was universally acclaimed as
America's greatest living judge." THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE
LEARNED HAND 1 (Hershel Shanks ed., 1968). "[S]o long as we shall continue to conceive of law
not as the disguised manifestation of mere will but as the effort of reason to discover justice, the
body of his opinions will be an enduring source of truth-seeking and illumination." Felix
Frankfurter, Judge Learned Hand, 60 HARV. L. REV. 325, 326 (1947). Charles Alan Wright
concluded similarly that a "major reason for the high regard in which Judge Hand was and is held
is the quality of his opinions." Charles Alan Wright, A Modern Hamlet in the Judicial Pantheon,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1995). Richard Posner offers empirical support suggesting the
exceptionally high regard in which the profession held Hand's opinions. See Posner, supra note
5, app. at 534 40 (showing that Hand was more frequently cited, often by a large margin, than
his colleagues on the Second Circuit who were, themselves, judges generally held in high regard).
For a rare and somewhat qualified view, see MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 155 57,
187 91 (1970) (questioning the grounds for the consensus about Hand's "greatness" though
seeming to acknowledge some degree of "greatness").
9. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 272.
10. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Judge Learned Hand's Contributions to PublicLaw, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 348, 348 (1947). "Hand's most significant contribution to the [Second Circuit] was his
application of the philosophy of American pragmatism to the art of judging." James Oakes,
Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 393 (1995).
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be written, four Judges will tower above the rest-Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo and Learned Hand."'
I do not wish to challenge such a nearly universal judgment, especially
one supported by so many august figures, but I will offer a mild-if perhaps
controversial-qualification: Hand's numerous accomplishments on the
bench do not stand as his strongest claim to enduring historical significance.
By "enduring historical significance," I should hasten to add, I mean a
continuing and substantial relevance to the concerns of later generations. On
that basis, I suggest that as extensive and admirable as Hand's achievements
on the bench may be, they are-perhaps sadly and even unfairly-too
obscure, transient, technical, and narrowly limited in their appeal to
command broad and enduring significance. 2
Instead, I propose that Hand's enduring historical significance rests on two
other grounds: his First Amendment jurisprudence expressed in Masses and
United States v. Dennis3 and his constitutional jurisprudence set forth in his
book The Bill ofRights. 4 Those are well-known achievements of recognized
11. Henry J. Friendly, Learned Hand An Expression from the Second Circuit, 29 BROOK.
L. REV. 6, 6 (1962); accord RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (1986) (Hand was "one of
America's best and most famous judges"); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION 141-42 (1990) (Hand was one of the great judges in American history and was, in
particular, better than another "great" judge, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo). Such tributes would
have pleased Hand immensely, for above all he prized what he termed the "job" of judging and
the art of fine judicial craftsmanship. Late in life he declared that "the joy of craftsmanship" was
"the most precious and dependable of our satisfactions." LEARNED HAND, At Fourscore, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 192, 198 (Irving Dilliard ed.,
Vintage Books 1959) [hereinafter HAND, At Fourscore]; accord LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 77 (1958) [hereinafter HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. "For Hand, the element of
craftsmanship was the reward of serving as a judge." Oakes, supra note 10, at 391 92. In a 1957
interview Hand declared that "I think the real salvation of mankind rests in what I like to call the
craftsman spirit .... Doing something well, something that's in himself, that he's succeeded, by
God, in putting there." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 25.
12. Hand's career was confined to the lower federal courts where he heard barely a handful
of constitutional cases and relatively few others of national importance. See Posner, supra note 5,
at 515. Most of a judge's time, he wrote, "consists of activity which seems to have small value
and small bearing on the greater issues of the community in which he lives." LEARNED HAND, To
Yale Law Graduates, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 65, 65. Lawyers and judges
were merely "workers in the hive; we shall not be missed, nor shall we be able to point at the end
to any perceptible contribution." Id. at 69. For a brief itemization of Hand's most influential
opinions on criminal, common law, and statutory issues, see Posner, supra note 5, at 513 14, and
for a fuller, though highly selective, treatment of Hand's judicial efforts, see GUNTHER, supra
note 2, chs. 3, 7, 12.
13. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
14. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11.
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importance, 5 of course, but I suggest that their broadest and most truly
enduring significance rests on grounds not commonly attributed to them,
grounds that are fundamental to-and deeply problematic for-American
constitutionalism. Those achievements exemplify the theoretically awkward
and challenging facts of change and subjectivity in even the most careful,
admired, and "timeless" of constitutional thinking. Suggesting the
unavoidable nature of change and subjectivity supports the claim that
establishing "a value free-mode of constitutional adjudication" is something
that simply "can't be done."' 6
My argument proceeds in four stages. Part I introduces Masses and The
Bill ofRights, noting the sound, if quite different, reasons why they have been
justly regarded as important.' Part II considers and challenges Hand's
seemingly well-established reputation as a constitutional theorist whose ideas
about free speech and judicial review remained consistent over his whole
career. It argues, to the contrary, that his constitutional thinking evolved in
response to developments in his own life and the affairs of the nation and,
more particularly, that as the years passed his constitutional thinking became
narrower, more rigid, and in some ways harmful to an understanding of
American constitutionalism. Parts III and IV explore the ways that the
narrowing and rigidification of his constitutional thinking altered his ideas
about both free speech and judicial review. Part III argues that his opinion in
Dennis was inconsistent with the free speech values he proclaimed in Masses
and that-in contrast to his innovative opinion in Masses-it restricted
speech rights more sharply than Supreme Court precedents required. It shows
that Hand's constitutional thinking had changed significantly in the three-
plus decades between the two cases. Part IV argues that The Bill of Rights-
in spite of its closely reasoned and ostensibly timeless pose-was a time-
15. Any discussion of Hand's career and significance must inevitably address Dennis and
The Bill ofRights, Charles Alan Wright explained, because they are "two things in the record that
have troubled even some of Hand's greatest admirers." Wright, supra note 8, at 1849.
16. Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 142 (1981). "For those who
would choose a constitutional theory, ultimate questions of political morality therefore cannot be
avoided." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 535,
579 (1999); accord Arthur S. Miller & Ronald H. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 683 (1960).
17. Posner would largely disagree. Regarding Masses, he noted fairly that it was "unclear"
whether Hand's opinion had any influence on the Supreme Court in its famous free speech
decision in Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Posner, supra note 5, at 516. In The Bill
ofRights, his judgment was harsh. "Were Hand to be judged by his contributions to constitutional
law, he would be considered derivative, undistinguished, and out of the mainstream." Id. at 515.
Ultimately Posner "would rate Hand's contribution to constitutional thought slight." Id. at 520.
My argument for the importance of Hand's constitutional jurisprudence is based on grounds
different from those Posner applied.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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bound product suffused with arbitrary and subjective judgments. It shows that
both historical context and personal values underwrote Hand's evolving
constitutional thinking.
In conclusion, I suggest-given Hand's reputation for both judicial
"greatness" and jurisprudential consistency-that the broadest reason for the
enduring significance of his constitutional contributions is that they illustrate
the pervasive and unavoidable impact of context, change, and personal values
on constitutional thinking.
I. THE RECOGNIZED SIGNIFICANCE OF HAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Masses
Upon American entry into World War I Congress passed the Espionage
Act of 1917, prompting the Postmaster General to order The Masses, a small
radical magazine, banned from the mails. The magazine responded by asking
the Southern District of New York to enjoin the order, and Hand received the
assignment. 8 In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten9 he issued an opinion
declaring free speech "a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom,"
stressing that its suppression was "contrary to the use and wont of our
people,"2 and granting the magazine's requested injunction. Only hours later
the Second Circuit stayed Hand's injunction, and four months after that it
rejected his reasoning and reversed his decision on the merits.2 ' Two years
later, when the Supreme Court heard its first appeals involving prosecutions
under the act, the Justices ignored Hand's views on free speech, rejected
defendants' First Amendment defense, and upheld their convictions."
Although the courts rejected Hand's Masses opinion immediately and for
decades thereafter, it eventually and rightfully became "celebrated" as a
18. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 151 52.
19. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Defendant Thomas G. Patten
was the postmaster of New York City, and under orders from Postmaster General Albert S.
Burleson he issued the order banning The Masses from the mail. See James Weinstein, The Story
of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten: Judge Learned Hand, First Amendment Prophet, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 61, 67 68 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
20. Masses, 244 F. at 540.
21. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). On the case and Hand's role
in it, see Weinstein, supra note 19, at 66 73; GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 151 61.
22. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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landmark in First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it constituted an act of
considerable courage, a fact that Hand fully realized at the time and for which
he suffered professionally.24 American entry into the war unleashed both
governmental campaigns and widespread private abuses against those
suspected of "disloyalty" on even the most trivial and silly grounds, and the
federal courts by and large failed to protect the hysteria's thousands of
victims.25 Masses and a bare handful of other similar decisions could not stem
the wartime fervor, but they came to symbolize one of the noblest functions
that the federal courts are supposed to play.26
Second, Hand's opinion was also an act of intellectual boldness. Although
it rested on statutory grounds, it nonetheless challenged the established law
that allowed the government to punish speech that had a "bad tendency,"2
and it proposed a rigorous new limitation-one that seemed to imply a
constitutional foundation-on governmental power to suppress political
dissent.28 Words could not be punished for any "bad tendency" they might
23. MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM 114 (1991).
24. Hand told his wife that "I may have to suffer" for what he knew would be an unpopular
decision, GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 155, and the consequent hostile reaction contributed to his
initial failure to receive a promotion to the Second Circuit in 1917 and likely to his failure to be
nominated for the Supreme Court in 1922. Id. at 152, 270 71, 274 75.
25. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870-1920, at 255 61
(1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 153 58 (2004). "[F]ederal judges within and outside
the Second Circuit, anxious to demonstrate their loyalty and to aid the war effort, were 'highly
immoderate' in passing on Espionage Act cases and in imposing sentences." JEFFREY B. MORRIS,
FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS IN NEW
YORK, CONNECTICUT AND VERMONT 115 (1987). On government suppression efforts, see, for
example, WILLIAM H. THOMAS JR., UNSAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: WORLD WAR I AND THE U.S.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S COVERT CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (2008); HARRY N. SCHEIBER,
THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: 1917 1921 (1960).
26. See RABBAN, supra note 25, at 261 69; STONE, supra note 25, at 160 70. The few other
relatively protective decisions "came too late and too infrequently to make any difference in most
cases." RABBAN, supra note 25, at 269. Weinstein paints Hand's position most starkly: "Standing
virtually alone among the federal judiciary against this onslaught on civil liberties during World
War I was Learned Hand." Weinstein, supra note 19, at 62.
27. For the dominance of the "bad tendency" test in both federal and state courts at the time,
see RABBAN, supra note 25, at 132 47.
28. Hand based his decision in Masses on a narrow construction of the Espionage Act, but
he adopted that narrow construction on the ground that it was required by principle and practice
that seemed of constitutional stature. To limit the statute, for example, he invoked "the normal
assumption of democratic government," and "the privilege of the individual in countries
dependent upon the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority." Masses Publ'g
Co. v. United States, 244 F. 535, 539 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Hand
understood his opinion as setting out "a constitutional standard." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 158.
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have, Hand maintained, but only if they expressly advocated the commission
of an unlawful act.29 Thus, his opinion added a critical new idea to the
developing law of free speech, the principle that words should be punishable
only if they constituted a direct "incitement" to actual law breaking.3"
Third, Hand's ideas about the importance of free speech gradually, if
unevenly, seeped into the legal profession's First Amendment thinking. It
inspired important scholars and free speech advocates, and it most likely
helped inform the evolving views of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and
Louis D. Brandeis whose subsequent First Amendment opinions became
classic statements elaborating the free speech values that Hand's opinion
outlined." Eventually, something close to Hand's "incitement" test worked
its way into the nation's constitutional law. In 1969 the Court adopted a
version of it in Brandenburg v. Ohio, its towering and highly protective free
speech decision.32 There, the Court adopted a double limitation on
government power to suppress or punish speech, joining a kind of
"incitement" test to a particularly demanding idea of "clear and present
danger."33
29. E.g., Words would not be protected if they had "no purport but to counsel the violation
of law." Masses, 244 F. at 540. Hand's "incitement" test had been suggested earlier by others,
particularly Professor Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN,
FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 217, 268 (2008). When Hand wrote Masses he
was apparently unaware of Freund's earlier work. See Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S.
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Ernst Freund (May 7, 1919), in REASON AND IMAGINATION,
supra note 3, at 74.
30. See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 25, at 264 65. Subsequently, Hand explained that he
wanted to articulate a test that would avoid difficult fact issues and jury questions, developing "a
qualitative formula" that was "hard, conventional, difficult to evade." Id. at 333 34. He also
described it as "an absolute and objective test" applied to the meaning of language. GUNTHER,
supra note 2, at 168.
31. For the initial example of Hand's influence, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1920) and DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW
22 35 (1986). For a critical view of Chafee's scholarship on the point, see, for example, GRABER,
supra note 23, at ch. 4. On the process of "seeping," see, for example, RABBAN, supra note 25, at
chs. 7 8; GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 161 70; Weinstein, supra note 19, at 78 94; Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 1. For Holmes, see Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Homes, J., dissenting) (Brandeis, J., joining.). For Brandeis,
see, for example, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
32. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Hand's Masses opinion "was vindicated by
the Supreme Court" in Brandenberg. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 603. Weinstein qualifies
Gunther's judgment, noting certain differences between Masses and Brandenberg. See Weinstein,
supra note 19, at 78 81.
33. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 25, at 522 24; Weinstein, supra note 19, at 79 81; Gerald
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments
from History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754 55 (1975).
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B. The Bill of Rights
Some thirty years later, in 1958, Hand gave the prestigious Holmes
Lectures at the Harvard Law School which were immediately published
under the title The Bill of Rights. There, Hand issued sweeping constitutional
prescriptions calling for extreme limitations on the power ofjudicial review. 4
The book embraced majoritarian principles, affirmed the policy-making
supremacy of the political branches, denied that judicial review had any
constitutional foundation, and warned incessantly of the dangers of judicial
subjectivity in construing vague constitutional provisions, particularly the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.35 Courts should invalidate the
acts of the other levels and branches of government, he argued, only as a last
resort-only when judicial intervention was necessary to prevent the failure
of the constitutional enterprise itself. 6 Applying any standard broader than
the minimalist one he advanced, Hand maintained, would turn the Court into
a "third legislative chamber"3  fully empowered to reconsider and redo
legislative policy judgments. 8
Although immediate reaction to the book was generally negative,39 it has
nonetheless merited enduring significance for three reasons. One was that it
34. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 652 62.
35. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11.
36. See id. at 14 15, 29 30, 56. "The test of the proper scope ofjudicial review of a statute
being, as I have said, only to set the ambit of what is legislation and not to redress any abuses in
the exercise of power." Id. at 37; accord id. at 66. "Judge Hand's prescription ofjudicial restraint
is very strong medicine. Indeed, it is the therapy of nearly total abstinence." ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 48
(1962).
37. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 42, 55, 68 69. See id. at 70.
38. "[I]f what I have said is true of those choices that any statute imposes, I do not see how
a court can invalidate them without putting itself in the same position and declaring whether the
legislature's substitute is what the court would have coined to meet the occasion." HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 39. A court's choice would be "an authentic exercise of the
same process that produced the statute itself" Id. The "appraisal of values," he insisted, was "the
essence of legislation." Id. at 70.
39. Reviews "proved almost universally negative." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 662. Posner,
for example, called the book "a bust," dismissed it as "derivative, undistinguished, and out of the
mainstream," and concluded that "I would rate Hand's contribution to constitutional thought
slight." Posner, supra note 5, at 515, 520. The principal exception at the time of its publication
came in the welcoming response of Southern segregationists and their allies who immediately
approved Hand's minimalist theory of judicial review and his rejection of the Court's reasoning
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See id. at 518. They invoked his name in
support of their efforts to discredit the Court and retaliate against its desegregation decisions by
cutting its jurisdiction. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 659 62. In subsequent letters to the Senate,
Hand carefully but clearly separated himself from their effort. See id. At the end of the day, "Hand
stood, then, virtually alone." Id. at 664.
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embodied the mature, probing, and carefully articulated views of an
experienced and brilliant legal mind addressing a central issue in American
constitutionalism. Such an effort, by its nature, commanded attention.
Second, the book presented a truly distinctive theory of judicial review, a
defense of extreme judicial minimalism that was deftly structured and
elegantly argued. It stands as a kind of monument in American constitutional
thinking, carrying on and extending a tradition of constitutional argument
over the proper role of the judiciary that began with the founding and that
will continue as long as the Constitution itself remains in force.4"
Third, The Bill ofRights not only resonated with the political controversies
of its day4' but, far more important, had a broader impact on subsequent
constitutional thinking. From Herbert Wechsler and Alexander Bickel
through Ronald Dworkin and John Hart Ely to their many successors in the
present day, Hand's book forced American constitutionalists to grapple with
its extreme challenge to judicial review and to seek convincing ways to justify
the practice and identify its proper scope.42 Unlike Masses, The Bill of Rights
enlisted few converts, and its major impact came, ironically, in spurring
developments that strengthened rather than weakened the judicial power that
Hand sought to severely limit.43
40. Hand will "be remembered and honored for restructuring the dialogue about restraint
and activism in judicial review so that both must be defended on the basis of the fundamental
assumptions about the American democratic system." GRIFFITH, supra note 4, at 232.
41. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 659 62.
42. See BICKEL, supra note 36, at 46 49; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
140 (1978); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 1 7 (1959). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
43. In recent decades the Supreme Court has become ever more confident in asserting its
authority as "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text." United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). That, together with the increasingly "conservative" nature of its
decisions, has spurred new criticisms and attacks on the Court's power of judicial review, though
most fall short of Hand's extreme position. See James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the
Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 216 218 (2000) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)); Symposium, Theories of Taking the
Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343 (2005). For a review of
much of the post-Hand literature on theories of judicial review, see, for example, ELY, supra note
42, at 43 72; Brian Boynton, Note, Democracy and Distrust After Twenty Years: Ely's Process
Theory and Constitutional Law from 1990 to 2000, 53 STAN. L. REV. 397, 398 414 (2000).
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II. RE-APPROACHING HAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: THE
UNAVOIDABLE SWAY OF HISTORY
A. The Legalistic View: Hand as a Consistent Constitutional Theorist
Understandably, constitutional lawyers and theorists tend to focus on the
logic of legal arguments, and this often leads them to minimize or ignore both
historical context and the fact of change. Useful for purposes of theoretical
clarity and formal legal advocacy, such a practice comes with costs. In
Hand's case, those costs have been substantial.
Commonly, legal scholars studying Hand have stressed the consistent
elements in his jurisprudence.44 Gunther, for example, highlighted the basic
consistencies that he saw running through Hand's career: his skeptical
philosophical outlook, commitments to individual liberty and popular
government, advocacy and practice of "judicial restraint," opposition to
judicial review, and belief in free speech and intellectual freedom.45 Though
acknowledging that Hand's "doubts about judicial activism had increased
during his last years,"46 Gunther nonetheless emphasized Hand's overriding
consistency. "As a judge and as a private citizen committed to freedom of
expression," he declared, "Hand clearly had not changed in the four decades
since the Masses ruling."4
Many others have issued similar verdicts. The Bill of Rights was
"grounded on a half-century of advocacy ofjudicial restraint," Marvin Schick
explained, and Hand's views in the book "should not have come as a surprise
to anyone familiar with his decisions and extrajudicial writings."48 The views
expressed in the book, another scholar declared, "simply-and fairly-
represent the unwavering consistency of Hand's views from law school until
44. In contrast, a few historians have noted the importance of context and change in Hand's
career. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Commentary, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 714, 714 (1995); Jack Van
Doren, Is Jurisprudence Politics by Other Means? The Case of Learned Hand, 33 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1998).
45. Gunther does recognize some changes in Hand's thinking over the years. See, e.g.,
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 384 (loss of "reformist zeal" in 1920s); id. at 444 (evolving attitude
toward New Deal); id. at 664 (increased doubts about judicial review).
46. Id. at 664. "Hand's provocative message of 1958 did resemble, even if it exceeded, those
he had articulated earlier." Id. at 665.
47. Id. at 664. "Hostility to judges' tendency to pour their personal preferences into vague
constitutional phrases was Hand's most consistent, deep-seated feeling about courts .... Id.
48. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 156. Hand was "a more consistent proponent of judicial
restraint than Frankfurter." Id. at 161.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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his death."4 9 The "views Hand expressed in The Bill of Rights," Posner
maintained, "were the same ones he had expressed throughout his
professional life."5 Such statements suggest that time and context made little
or no difference to Hand and his constitutional thinking.
B. A Historical View: The Fact of Change
Although Hand may have been unusually consistent in articulating certain
views and values, he nonetheless did change over time, and those changes
helped reorient his constitutional thinking in significant ways. Although
generalized ideas about judicial restraint, the values of free speech, and the
policy-making authority of the political branches appeared repeatedly in his
writings, the meaning and implications of those ideas shifted over the
decades, taking on new and different shadings as Hand and the times
changed.5 ' Mere consistency in repeating certain words, phrases, and
generalized ideas reveals little about a speaker's specific understanding of
their meanings and applications in different real-world contexts.
From a young small-town lawyer unconcerned with politics in the 1890s,52
Hand turned into an enthusiastic Progressive activist in the first decade of the
twentieth century. With a new and "passionate commitment" to reform,53 he
became a close friend and ally of the Progressive theorist Herbert Croly,
whom he admired as "noble" because of his intense and inspiring "sense of
justice."54 He sharply criticized the Supreme Court's conservative decisions
and-while remaining on the federal bench-worked closely with Theodore
Roosevelt in his 1912 "Bull Moose" campaign for president. Then the
following year-still remaining a federal judge-he stood for election as the
Progressive Party's candidate for chief judge of the New York Court of
Appeals. In 1914 he helped Croly found The New Republic and thereafter
wrote regularly for Progressivism's new national voice. In an article in 1915,
49. Marc M. Arkin, The Tenth Justice, NEW CRITERION, May 1994, at 79 (reviewing
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)).
50. Posner, supra note 5, at 519.
51. The same words and phrases can often take on numerous and quite different meanings
for different people, especially those living at different times and in different places. See, e.g.,
JACCO BOMHOFF, BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF
POSTWAR LEGAL DISCOURSE 1 (2013).
52. "Hand's alienation from politics began to fade when the Spanish-American War broke
out in 1898." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 62.
53. Id. at 190.
54. FELIx FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 88 (Harlan B. Phillips ed.,
1960).
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for example, he denounced the Court's anti-Progressive decisions in
particularly blunt terms. "Are we not finally driven to the conclusion that
such decisions come from the prejudices of that economic class to which all
the justices belong," he asked.55 In private, he was even harsher, referring to
the anti-Progressive Justices as "mastiffs" and condemning their decisions as
an "accumulated mass of rubbish."56 "For once in his life," Gunther
concluded, "he was a true believer."5
Most revealing, in 1916 Hand published an essay in the Harvard Law
Review entitled The Speech of Justice where he gave voice to his vaulting
Progressive hopes.58 The "pious traditionalism of the law" is valuable, he
declared, but
with this piety must go a taste for courageous experiment .... It is
in this aspect that the profession of the law is in danger of failing in
times like our own when deep changes are taking place in the
convictions of men .... Only as an articulate organ of the half-
understood aspirations of living men, constantly recasting and
adapting existing forms, bringing to the high light of expression the
dumb impulses of the present, can [lawyers] continue in the course
of the ancestors whom they revere.59
On that bold Progressive premise, Hand rejected judicial passivity and
accepted the need for a focused and reform-oriented judicial activism.
"Conservative political opinion" held that the judge was only a "passive
interpreter" of the law, he declared, but that "opinion is not disinterested.
60
It was, rather, "framed for the most part for the protection of property and for
55. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 249.
56. Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y, to Felix
Frankfurter (Oct. 9, 1914), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 54 55. Hand scorned
"the fatuous floundering of the Supreme Court," calling its opinions "pitiable" and its work a
"solemn farce." Id. at 54 55; accord GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 248.
57. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 190. For Hand in the Progressive Era, see id. at 190 269.
58. See Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. REv. 617 (1916). It is important
to note that at the time he wrote The Speech of Justice Hand, born in 1872, was in his mid-forties.
His commitment to Progressivism and judicial activism, then, was hardly a product of either naive
youth or political inexperience.
59. LEARNED HAND, The Speech of Justice, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 10,
12 13 [hereinafter HAND, The Speech of Justice]. Hand's comments seemed to echo some of the
criticisms he had made in The New Republic the previous year. There he charged that the
conservative Court had "failed to comprehend the hopes and aspirations of hundreds of thousands
of living men" and shown their "blindness to the beliefs of certainly half the economists of the
present time." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 249 (quoting Learned Hand, Normal Inequalities of
Fortune, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 1915, at 5).
60. HAND, The Speech of Justice, supra note 59, at 10.
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the prevention of thoroughgoing social regulation."'61 Although judges had
only limited power, he asserted, "the judge has, by custom, his own proper
representative character as a complementary organ of the social will. 62
Consequently, he continued, the judge also has a "free power by
interpretation to manifest the half-framed purposes of his time. 63
Although on the bench he sought to apply existing law conscientiously,
when opportunity offered he jumped to serve as the "complementary organ
of the social will" that he praised.64 In 1913 he enforced established obscenity
law but went out of his way to defend a novel depicting the harsh social plight
of poor young women.65 Disdaining established law as representing "mid-
Victorian" morality, he urged that it be changed "to answer to the
understanding and morality of the present time. 66 The next year he took an
even bolder step, construing a state statute with an expansive breadth that
went significantly beyond established law and allowed an injured worker to
prevail over a company's well-founded legal defense designed specifically to
deny such recoveries. 6' Then, of course, he wrote Masses.
Indeed, as late as 1919 Hand retained a belief in the necessity and propriety
of an activist judiciary. "It is of course true that any kind ofjudicial legislation
is objectionable on the score of the limited interests which a Court can
represent," he wrote to Brandeis in 1919, "yet there are wrongs which in fact
legislatures cannot be brought to take an interest in, at least not until the
Courts [sic] have acted. 68
Although strains of Progressivism remained in Hand's thinking into the
1920s, his enthusiasm for reform-like that of so many other Progressives-
began to fade rapidly after the war. By 1920 he had not only abandoned
Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party but had also split with Croly
and his old allies at The New Republic. By the next year he seemed to look
back on his Progressive aspirations with a sense of nostalgia and lOSS.
6 9




65. See United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
66. Id. at 120; see GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 148 51.
67. See Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 53 (2d Cir. 1914) (Hand, J.,
sitting by designation), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915); Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand
and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 376 78 (1947).
68. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 579 n.* (1946).
69. "I can have the hope that in America time may at length mitigate our fierce
individualism," he told the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1921. GUNTHER,
supra note 2, at 148. Future years, he continued, "may teach us the knowledge we so sorely lack
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As his Progressivism withered and then disappeared, Hand's
constitutional thinking began to narrow and rigidify. The process was long,
complicated, and multi-factored."0 His deep personal insecurities, painful and
humiliating marriage, and continuing disappointment over the rejection of his
prized Masses opinion stoked his personal fearfulness and instinctive
deferential tendencies, while his shifting relationships with Walter Lippmann
and Felix Frankfurter led him to seriously rethink some of his earlier ideas.
Then a series of political developments-cynical new critiques of "public
opinion," the spread of "realistic" theories of democracy, and the distressing
rise of fascism in his beloved Italy and then Nazism in Germany-combined
with a number of concurrent changes in his personal situation-growing
recognition by the elite bar, sharpening fears about threats to the judiciary,
and the satisfying but constraining reputation he was earning as a master of
statutory construction-combined to accelerate the process. In 1942 his final
and anguished failure to gain a seat on the Supreme Court seemed to complete
the transformation."' By the end of World War II, Hand had essentially
resigned himself to the social and political status quo and to a highly
restrictive view of the courts as institutions operating in a harsh, shallow,
endangered, conflict-ridden, and all-too-frail American democracy. 2
that each of us must learn to realize himself more in our communal life whose formal expression
is and as I believe will continue to be the law." Id.
70. The following paragraph is based on the analysis in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned
Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 903 18
(1995). On the delicate and intimate subject of Hand's unusual marriage, see GUNTHER, supra
note 2, at 77 85, 95 98, 183 89.
71. Eight years later Hand confessed his feelings about the failure in a private letter. "I can
say it now without the shame that I suppose I should feel I longed as the thing beyond all else
that I craved to get a place on it." GUNTHER, supra note 2. at 569. Hand's letters reveal how he
"was bitterly disappointed in not having had the one achievement he most wanted: his own seat
on the Supreme Court." Ronald Dworkin, Preface to REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at
xi; see Purcell, supra note 70, at 914 16.
72. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY supra note 11, at 70, 74 [hereinafter HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities].
"[M]en often answer for reasons quite alien to the issue; they seldom have anything that can truly
be called an opinion." Id. "The common will as the official sees it, is not common at all; it is a
complex of opposing forces, whose resultant has no relation to the common good .... Id. at 75.
"In any society, I submit, the aggressive and insistent will have disproportionate power," and "the
stronger have always had their way." Id. at 76. The virtue of American democracy was that "at
least it gives a bloodless measure of social forces" and provides "a means of continuity, a principle
of stability." Id. at 76. "Nor will I forsake the faith of our fathers in democracy, however I must
transmute it, and make it unlovely to their eyes .... Id. at 77. "Liberty is so much latitude as the
powerful choose to accord to the weak." LEARNED HAND, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 51, 55 [hereinafter HAND, Sources of Tolerance]; accord LEARNED
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The change in his thinking was express. In 1915 he denounced the
conservative Supreme Court for enforcing "the prejudices of that economic
class to which all the justices belong.""' A decade later he wrote that judges
"are almost inevitably drawn from the propertied class and share its
assumptions. Perhaps it is on the whole better so."" More striking, in 1916
he had declared that the judge was "a complementary organ of the social will"
and held the "free power" to implement "the half-framed purposes of his
time. '"" In 1942 he declared that the "price of [the judge's] continued power
must therefore be a self-denying ordinance which forbids change in what has
not already become unacceptable."' 6
C. Touchstone and Milestones: Hand, Brandeis, and Thayer's "Rule of
the Clear Mistake"
When Hand was in law school at Harvard, he took constitutional law from
James Bradley Thayer whom he came whole-heartedly to admire. "Hand's
deep convictions about the limited role of judges in curbing legislative
choices," Gunther explained, were "first formed at the feet of his influential
Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer."" Hand identified Thayer as
"the teacher who counted most with me," 78 and he often proclaimed him his
constitutional mentor and guide. Over the years he repeatedly invoked his
teachings to support his own ideas about judicial review. 80
HAND, Is There a Common Will?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 36, 41 [hereinafter
HAND, Is There a Common Will?].
73. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 249.
74. LEARNED HAND, Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra
note 11, at 18, 19 [hereinafter HAND, Mr. Justice Holmes].
75. HAND, The Speech of Justice, supra note 59, at 11.
76. LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 118, 121 [hereinafter HAND, Contribution of an Independent
Judiciary].
77. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at xvi. Gunther characterized The Bill of Rights as presenting
Thayer's ideas "in their most extreme form." Id.
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id. at 51. Hand's notes from Thayer's class are preserved in the Hand Papers, and they
show "how carefully LH recorded his lectures." Id. at 700 n.71.
80. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 51 52, 119, 373. In his letters to Felix Frankfurter, "Hand
was at once a dedicated exponent of the legal philosophy of James Bradley Thayer." REASON AND
IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at xvi. Praising one of Hand's circuit court opinions, Frankfurter
gave him the highest compliment: "J. B. Thayer would have been very proud of you." Letter from
Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Oct. 21, 1935), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at
Part 3, Reel 26, Frame 758 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School
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In 1893, Hand's first year in law school, Thayer published his famous
essay on The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law,8 ' propounding what came to be known as the "rule of the clear mistake."
Courts should not invalidate a legislative or executive act, Thayer argued,
unless its unconstitutionality was "so clear that it is not open to rational
question."82 Two years later Hand took Thayer's class in constitutional law
and found his teacher's ideas compelling. In The Bill of Rights he surely
echoed Thayer's "rule of the clear mistake" when he declared that "courts
might, and indeed they always do, disclaim authority to intervene unless they
are sure beyond doubt that the [legislative] compromise imposed is wrong."83
The fact that Thayer "influenced" Hand, however, was far from the whole
story. Hand was, in fact, quite conscious of pressing Thayer's ideas in his
own distinctive ways, and the year after he published The Bill of Rights he
questioned whether he had taken his teacher's theory to unwarranted
conclusions. "I have often asked myself," he wrote, "how far [Thayer] would
recognize as legitimate descendants my own views about constitutional
law."84 The likelihood was that Thayer would have balked, for Hand
constitutional thinking diverged notably from Thayer's.85
Most apparent, in his Progressive enthusiasm before the war Hand adopted
a sweeping version of the "rule of the clear mistake." Thayer had explicitly
Library). For his part, Frankfurter believed that "no man has thought more profoundly on
constitutional law than J. B. Thayer-I do not exclude Holmes or Brandeis." Letter from Felix
Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Wiley Rutledge, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S. (May 2, 1944), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3,
Reel 26, Frame 332 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
It was, he wrote, "one of the tragedies of my life that [Thayer] was gone by the time I entered the
Law School." Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Oct. 21, 1940), microformed
on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frame 849 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library).
81. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
82. Id.
83. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 39. Earlier Hand had also echoed Thayer
when he declared dramatically that "a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no
court can save." HAND, Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 125. In his
essay on the "American Doctrine," Thayer had written that "[u]nder no system can the power of
courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere." Thayer, supra note
81, at 156.
84. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 52.
85. For example, Hand parted with Thayer to serve his "Bull Moose" Progressivism when
he accepted the dormant Commerce Clause, GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 448, a doctrine that Thayer
seemed to reject. See Sanford Byron Gabin, Judicial Review, James Bradley Thayer, and the
"Reasonable Doubt" Test, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 980 83 (1976).
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made the rule applicable to judicial review of the work of "co-ordinate"
departments,86 that is, federal judicial review of federal executive and
legislative acts, not federal review of state acts.8 In the latter case, according
to Thayer, the federal courts had a different and higher responsibility, for they
were charged "in all questions involving the powers of the general
government to maintain that power as against the States in its fulness."88
Consequently, when the federal courts reviewed actions of states, they were
to apply a more rigorous standard and construe the Constitution "in its true
and just proportions."89 The purpose of Thayer's "rule of the clear mistake,"
in other words, was to prevent the federal courts from applying the stricter
"true and just" standard to acts of the national legislative and executive
branches. When the federal courts reviewed state actions, in contrast, that
"true and just" standard, not the "rule of the clear mistake," properly
applied.9"
Hand, however, accepted the interpretation of Thayer's rule that leading
Progressive legal thinkers, including Brandeis and Frankfurter, were
advancing.9' Severely limiting Thayer's "true and just" standard,"92 they
86. Thayer, supra note 81, at 150, 153 55.
87. Thayer stated that his discussion of the rule of the clear mistake was addressed to the
standards applicable to judicial review by the federal courts. "I have been speaking," he explained,
"of the national judiciary." Id. at 155.
88. Id. at 154.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 144, 153. Compare id. at 153 (federal court review of federal actions), with id. at
154 55 (federal court review of state actions). In The Bill of Rights Hand seemed to reassert the
Progressive interpretation of Thayer, assuming that authority to construe the Constitution must
rest with the national government but that the same standard of review should apply to the judicial
review of both federal and state actions. See HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 10
15.
91. Purcell, supra note 70, at 884 96. For Thayer's influence on Progressive legal thinkers,
see, for example, GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 51 52, 373; Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of
James B. Thayer Upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REv. 71,
71 74 (1978). Frankfurter embraced Thayer and his "rule of the clear mistake" and wrote that
Thayer had also "influenced Holmes, Brandeis, the Hands [Learned and his cousin Augustus, also
a judge on the Second Circuit]" and other progressives. FRANKFURTER, supra note 54, at 299.
92. Progressive legal theorists construed the "true and just" standard as applying only to
state actions directly threatening the power of the national government and not to state actions
challenging individual constitutional rights. Frankfurter stated this interpretation clearly and
explicitly in his dissent in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646
(1943). There, opposing the Court's invalidation of a state flag-salute law, he declared that the
proper "analysis is that of James Bradley Thayer" and explained that judicial intervention in the
case was improper because "in a question like this we are not passing on the proper distribution
of political power as between the states and the central government." Id. at 667 68. Thayer's rule,
however, did not have to be construed so rigidly and narrowly. In his American Doctrine essay,
Thayer stated generally that the "true and just" standard applied whenever an issue involved "the
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insisted that the "rule of the clear mistake" applied equally to federal judicial
review of state as well as federal actions. By making the rule an all-
encompassing limit on the judiciary, they hoped to restrict the anti-
Progressive federal courts and give the states wider latitude in enacting and
implementing the reform measures they favored.93
The reason for the difference between Thayer's original theory and Hand's
Progressive interpretation was apparent. Thayer, born in 1831 in Haverhill,
Massachusetts, was a Yankee Unionist whose ardent nationalism was forged
in the heat of the Civil War and whose "American Doctrine" was designed to
protect the "paramount authority" of the national government.94 Hand and his
fellow legal Progressives-generations removed from the slavery-based
crises of the mid-nineteenth century-were middle-class professionals
confronted by the social turmoil of the early twentieth century. Driven by the
challenges of a new industrial age, they were inspired not by past conflicts
between nation and states but rather by the ever-widening reformist upsurge
that repeatedly pitted the increasingly active legislatures of both nation and
states against the relatively conservative courts.95 Consequently, they
supreme law of the land" and the question was "whether State action be or be not conformable to
the paramount constitution." Thayer, supra note 81, at 154. Arguably, then, the "true and just"
standard could apply whenever state actions challenged "supreme" federal law or any rights
established by "the paramount constitution." Thayer was focused on the different legal issues of
a different age, and he did not directly address free speech issues as such. His collected essays did
not even mention the First Amendment. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908).
93. In equating the standards applicable to judicial review of federal and state acts, Hand
passed over the point that his judicial idol, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, had made. "I do not
think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void," Holmes had declared. "I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several states." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Law and the
Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295 96 (1920).
94. Thayer, supra note 81, at 154; see Purcell, supra note 70, at 887 90.
95. Purcell, supra note 70, at 890 96. Legal Progressives were also animated by different
values that gave their jurisprudence a different orientation. Whereas Thayer stressed the argument
that courts should be restrained to protect democratic decision-making, Thayer, supra note 81, at
131 32, 149; GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 700 n.71, the Progressives both strengthened and
qualified Thayer's emphasis by arguing that courts should give legislatures the broadest leeway
because legislatures were able to conduct scientific studies of complex new social problems and
draw on the knowledge of experts. PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
335 (1984). They believed that the courts, in contrast, lacked both the training and resources
necessary to deal wisely with those pressing new problems. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 121;
Purcell, supra note 70, at 893 94. In spite of his intellectual skepticism, Hand continued to believe
throughout his life that science offered the only possibility for improvements in the human
condition. See, e.g., Letter from Learned Hand, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to Julian Huxley (Aug. 8, 1950), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 295;
LEARNED HAND, The One Condition, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 169, 170; HAND,
Sources of Tolerance, supra note 72, at 64.
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construed Thayer's rule to apply not only to federal judicial review of "co-
ordinate" departments but to review of state actions as well.
In the 1920s, however, the legal and political context changed, and Hand
had to make another critical choice in interpreting the meaning and
application of Thayer's rule. As more issues involving free speech and other
"personal" rights came to the Court, they began to divide legal Progressives.
This time, however, Hand proved surprisingly inflexible.
Understandably, when the conservative Court expanded due process
doctrine to protect certain family and parental rights, Hand rejected the
innovation. 96 Sounding his old Progressive values, he criticized the Court for
subjective decision-making and argued that its new doctrine would further
encourage anti-progressive judicial activism and provoke more political
attacks on the judiciary. 9' On due process issues he remained firm and insisted
that the power of judicial review should be exercised "only in the extremest
cases."98
Far less understandably, however, Hand showed himself curiously erratic
and ultimately inexplicably rigid in addressing contemporaneous First
Amendment issues. In spite of his repeated and ardent praise for the values
of free speech, he refused to accept the implicit reinterpretation of Thayer's
rule that Brandeis was developing as a justification for greater judicial
protection for speech rights. No less than Hand, Brandeis had been
"influenced" by Thayer, and he was equally an advocate of the "rule of the
clear mistake." 99 As a law student at Harvard Brandeis had also taken
Thayer's constitutional law class and, moreover, had developed a close
personal friendship with Thayer, closer than Hand enjoyed with their shared
mentor.' In spite of his Thayerian roots, however, Brandeis had interpreted
96. The key cases were Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). "Meyer was a watershed," and "the split in Meyer among the liberal
justices was soon echoed throughout the civil liberties community." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at
377. See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA'S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016).
97. For Hand's reaction to the due process decisions, see GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 373
86.
98. Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to
Walter Lippmann (June 10, 1925), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 136; see
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 383.
99. LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA'S TRULY
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 25 26 (1983); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE
109, 477 (2009); Mendelson, supra note 91, at 73 75.
100. Thayer "was my best friend among the instructors at the Law School and we have been
quite intimate ever since. When he went abroad in 1882 1883 I undertook his course on the Law
of Evidence at his request." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (Oct. 13, 1890), in
1 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 92 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971). On
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the "rule of the clear mistake" expansively during the pre-war years to protect
Progressive reforms at the state level, and after the war he began, in effect, to
interpret Thayer's rule once again, this time to justify greater judicial
protection for speech rights.''
Brandeis did so by shifting focus from the rule's limitation on judicial
review to its animating constitutional purpose which was to protect the open
and well-informed operations of democratic government." 2 Accordingly,
Brandeis began to insist that freedom of speech was "essential to effective
democracy."' 3 It guaranteed the "fundamental right of free men" to bring
reason into the public forum and enabled them to "strive for better conditions
through new legislation and new institutions."'0 4 Participation in "public
discussion is a political duty," he declared, and that "should be a fundamental
principle of the American government."'0 5 Serving the same democratic
purpose that underwrote the "rule of the clear mistake," Brandeis's
developing free speech jurisprudence could be understood as an implicit
Brandeis's relation with Thayer, see STRUM, supra note 95, at 20; UROFSKY, supra note 99, at 37,
78 79.
101. For Brandeis's early opinions urging greater judicial protection for First Amendment
claims, see Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce v.
United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251
U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Judicial restraint remained a central component
of Brandeis's constitutional thinking, but his thinking also changed over time. UROFSKY, supra
note 99, at 477 78; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 117 24 & 345 n.10 (2000); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Judicial Legacy of Louis
Brandeis and the Nature ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 33 TOURO L. REV. 5, 29 32 (2017).
102. Thayer explained that courts exercising judicial review "will always assume a duly
instructed body" composed of "competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive" individuals who
were "intent only on public ends" and thus "fit to represent a self-governing people, such as our
theory of government assumes to be carrying on our public affairs." Thayer, supra note 81, at
149. "The rationally permissible opinion of which we have been talking," he continued, "is the
opinion reasonably allowable to such a person as this." Id; see id. at 131 32, 156. The notes Hand
took as a student in Thayer's constitutional law class "reveal how much emphasis Thayer gave to
the proper role of courts in a democratic society." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 700 n.71.
103. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). "Brandeis's
particular contribution to the development of speech law within this societal context was his
drawing on thinking by himself and others to connect the need for speech with the requirements
of democracy." PHILIPPA STRUM, SPEAKING FREELY: WHITNEY V. CALIFORNIA AND AMERICAN
SPEECH LAW 124 (2015). In addition to making the connection between free speech and
democracy, Brandeis also incorporated other arguments that free speech advocates had
developed, including the utility of free speech in promoting truth finding and protecting individual
liberty and autonomy. E.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
104. Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337 38
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
105. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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development of Thayer's constitutional thinking and an affirmation of his
most fundamental constitutional principle.
Indeed, others were able to discern the logic that connected Thayer's
principles to special judicial protection for speech rights." 6 Perhaps the most
noticeable was Ronald Dworkin, Hand's law clerk when he wrote The Bill of
Rights. Maintaining that Thayer played a "decisive role""' in shaping Hand's
thinking, Dworkin argued that Thayer had inculcated in Hand an implicit
"civic republicanism" that prized free speech and privileged the participation
of everyone "in the community's deepest and more important decisions about
justice."'0 8 On that Thayerian premise Dworkin developed an argument for
greater judicial activism in defending individual rights and deployed it in an
effort to mitigate the extreme judicial minimalism that Hand advocated in
The Bill of Rights.10 9
Hand's refusal to accept Brandeis's First Amendment reasoning was
particularly arresting because the Justice in effect issued him a special
invitation to embrace his approach. In his powerful concurrence in Whitney
v. California Brandeis celebrated the relationship between free speech and
democracy, and his reasoning sounded in places very much like Hand's in
Masses. 10 Brandeis began his opinion by expressly stating that defendant was
not charged with "incitement,""' and he seemed to incorporate Hand's
106. Most explicitly, Jerome Frank identified the pro-free speech potential in Thayer's rule
and argued that Justice Harlan Stone had such an understanding of the rule's implications. Jerome
N. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 691 93 (1957).
Speaking of the doctrine that judicial deference is based on "the availability of political means for
peaceful change," Martin Shapiro noted that "the seeds of the doctrine may even be found in
Thayer." MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
115 (1966); see id. at 16. For a rejection of such claims, see Gabin, supra note 85, at 975 77, 992.
The great majority of First Amendment scholars seem to ignore if not reject the idea that
Thayerian principles offer support for judicial protection of speech rights. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet,
Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Economy, 127 HARV. L.
REv. 2234, 2244 48 (2014).
107. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 342 (1996).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 340 47.
110. When he turned "to the practical task of distinguishing among admittedly risky forms
of speech," Brandeis's analysis bore "an arresting resemblance to Judge Hand's opinion in
Masses." HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 161
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). Brandeis's "Whitney opinion emphasized the impossibility of
maintaining a democratic society in the absence of free speech." STRUM, supra note 103, at 124.
111. "Thus the accused is to be punished, not for contempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for
a step in preparation." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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Masses test in his broader analysis." 2 Then he went out of his way to cite
Masses favorably-even though it was only a district court opinion that had
been quickly overruled-and, in a highly unusual reference in a Court
opinion, identified Hand by name as the opinion's author."3 Finally, Brandeis
went the extra mile. He solicited Hand's support by personally sending him
a copy of his Whitney opinion."4 Still Hand refused to accept Brandeis's
speech-protective logic.'1'
Throughout his life Hand insisted that questions of values were matters of
individual choice, and sometime between the late 1920s and the early 1940s
he chose not to accept Brandeis's interpretative move or his general First
Amendment jurisprudence. That choice was hardly a necessary one. Far
more, it was deeply puzzling.
First of all, Brandeis and Hand shared a commitment to free speech that
seemed equally important and compelling to both of them. In Masses Hand
spoke as passionately about its value as Brandeis did in Whitney." 6 Both,
moreover, were involved with overlapping groups of legal thinkers who were
formulating legal defenses for speech rights, and all of them were
methodically testing and drawing on one another's ideas in an effort to
112.
But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement,
between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must
be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it
must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or
was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such
advocacy was then contemplated.
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 376 n.4. Brandeis also cited an opinion by another Progressive federal district
court judge, Charles Amidon, whom he also identified by name. Id.
114. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Felix
Frankfurter (May 21, 1927), in 5 LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 285 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David
W. Levy eds., 1978).
115. As he declared flatly in The Bill of Rights, "I do not think that the interests mentioned
in the First Amendment are entitled in point of constitutional interpretation to a measure of
protection different from other interests." HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 56.
116. Hand's "commitment to free speech was even deeper than Holmes's, a commitment
springing from the depths of his skepticism about dominant truths and his fierce allegiance to
keeping open the channels of debate." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 281.
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strengthen their arguments."' "All of that," Philippa Strum noted, "lay behind
Brandeis's opinion in Whitney.""' 8 The 1920s was no time for legal theorists
committed to free speech to be unduly picky or excessively demanding in
rejecting strong and principled arguments that supported judicial
enforcement of the fundamental right they sought to defend.
Second, as Vincent Blasi and others have pointed out, Hand's Masses
opinion was itself based on the idea that there was a vibrant connection
between free speech and democratic government." 9 Indeed, when he wrote
Masses, Hand could well have been thinking about Thayer's insistence that
the role of the courts should be determined by the requirements of American
democracy. In explaining the importance of free speech, Masses invoked the
"normal assumptions of democratic government" and stressed that "public
opinion" was "the final source of government in a democratic state."'' 2 Most
striking, it declared that "tolerance of all methods of political agitation" was
essential as "a safeguard of free government.' 12' Brandeis's opinions
elaborated a similar logic linking free speech to democratic government, and
his basic argument supported the ideas and values Hand had expressed in
Masses.
22
Third, only two years before Whitney Hand had welcomed Holmes's
dissent in Gitlow v. New York. 23 There, Holmes had rejected the criminal
117. In addition to Brandeis and Hand, those involved in varying ways included Holmes,
Chafee, Walter Nelles, Ernst Freund, and lawyers involved with the new American Civil Liberties
Union. See, e.g., STRUM,supra note 103, at 120 21.
118. Id. at 120.
119.
Hand's view, most fully elaborated in his great opinion in Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, was that under democratic theory incitements to law violation
fall outside the ambit of the freedom of speech as a matter of principle,
irrespective of whether the context indicates an imminent danger of illegal
conduct by persons exposed to the speech. Hand held that view because he
considered incitements to law violation not to be among the 'exclusive' means
laid down by a democratic society 'by which its laws can be changed.'
Blasi, supra note 31, at 36; see also Gunther, supra note 33, at 725, 727; Weinstein, supra note
19, at 71.
120. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
121. Masses, 244 F. at 539 40. For classic discussions of the relation between free speech
and democratic government, see, for example, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,878 86, 955 (1963); and the essays collected in Virginia Law
Review Symposium on Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REv. 477 (2011).
122. In Masses Hand was "[a]nticipating the position that Brandeis would arrive at ten years
later in the Whitney case." STRUM, supra note 103, at 92.
123. 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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conviction of a leading socialist and urged a more demanding version of his
"clear and present danger" test.'24 Hand defended the dissent and declared
that he would have joined it had he been on the Court.'25 If Hand agreed with
Holmes's dissent in Gitlow, he should also have accepted the free speech
reasoning that Brandeis was developing in his own virtually
contemporaneous opinions.'26 Surely Holmes and Brandeis, in spite of their
differences,"' were closely identified in urging stronger judicial protection
for speech rights. Brandeis had joined Holmes's path-breaking dissent in
1919 in Abrams,'28 and over the following years Holmes commonly agreed
with Brandeis's separate dissents urging greater protection for speech
rights. 2 9 Indeed, Brandeis joined Holmes's dissent in Gitlow, 30 and Holmes
joined Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney."'
Finally, even though Hand disagreed with Brandeis's claim in Whitney
that some incitements to unlawful acts might nonetheless qualify as protected
speech,' his refusal to accept the basic thrust and conclusion of Brandeis's
124. Id. at 672 73.
125. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 280 81; Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court
for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Charles Merrill Hough, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (July 9, 1926), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 141.
126. Brandeis had consistently joined Holmes's opinions developing a more demanding
"clear and present danger" standard beginning with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and in 1920 he began writing separate dissents in defense of
broader free speech rights. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ'g Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gilbertv. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,
335 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). His
efforts reached their fullest statement in 1927 in Whitney.
127. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 281 85; RABBAN, supra note 25, at 355 59; Pnina
Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L.
&POL. 451 (1988).
128. 250 U.S. at 631.
129. Holmes joined Brandeis's dissents in Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 270 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting), and in a separate dissent in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic
Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 436 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), Holmes stated
that "I agree in substance" with Brandeis's dissent. The single exception was Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), where Holmes joined neither the majority's opinion nor
Brandeis's dissent and concurred without opinion only in the result. Id. at 334. On Holmes's
separate action in Gilbert, see FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 281 85.
130. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Brandeis, J.,
joining).
131. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Holmes, J.,
joining).
132. Id. at 376. "Going beyond Learned Hand, Brandeis argued [in Whitney] that even
advocacy of law 'violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free
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reasoning still remained hard to fathom. Most obviously, Hand could easily
have rejected that particular point while still accepting Brandeis's broader
and powerful democratic justification for judicial protection of First
Amendment rights. More to the point, Hand harbored serious reservations
about Holmes's "clear and present danger" test,'33 yet he nonetheless
embraced Holmes's dissent in Gitlow that employed that standard. Thus,
mere disagreement with some element of Brandeis's free speech opinions
should not have prevented him from accepting their basic reasoning. Perhaps
most telling, Hand defended Holmes's Gitlow dissent not on the ground that
he agreed with its doctrinal analysis but on the highly pragmatic ground of
practical necessity. Without some such protective judicial theory, even the
flawed one Holmes proposed, Hand wrote, "the whole doctrine of free speech
goes by the board."' 34 He insisted that he would not let that happen because
he was "all for keeping the flag flying."' 35 To whatever extent Hand disagreed
with anything in Brandeis's reasoning, Whitney and Brandeis's other First
Amendment opinions were quite obviously and prominently "keeping the
flag flying." Still, Hand was unable or unwilling to accept them. 136
speech where ... there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on."'
STONE, supra note 25, at 237 38.
133. "I do not altogether like the way Justice Holmes put the ["clear and present danger"]
limitation." Gunther, supra note 33, at 763 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Dec. 3,
1919)). Hand "had frequently expressed his criticisms of Holmes's 'clear and present danger'
formula." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 281; see id. at 167; Gunther, supra note 33, at 732 41; id.
at 770 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch. (Jan. 2, 1921)). In developing the "clear and
present danger" test, Hand wrote, "I cannot help thinking that for once Homer nodded." HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 59. Holmes "for once slipped his trolley on 'clear and
present [danger]."' Letter from Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (June 8, 1951), in REASON
AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 306.
134. Letter from Learned Hand to Charles Merrill Hough, supra note 125, at 141; see
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 280 81.
135. Letter from Learned Hand to Charles Merrill Hough, supra note 125, at 141; see
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 280 81.
136. Hand's refusal to embrace Brandeis's reasoning was apparently rooted in his changed
thinking about the nature of both democracy and the role of courts, see supra note 72, and
confirmed by his likely identification of Brandeis with both the Progressive judicial "activism"
he was rejecting and the judicial subjectivism he condemned in the pre-New Deal Court.
"Brandeis's [judicial] outlook," Hand believed, was influenced by his views on "general social
and political matters." Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 8, 1937),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frames 793 95 (Univ. Publ'ns of
Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Finally, Hand revered Holmes as his
"unblemished idol on the bench," GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 345, and regarded Brandeis as a
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Thus, given both his profound commitment to free speech and his pre-war
flexibility in interpreting Thayer for Progressive purposes, 3 Hand's
unwillingness to accept Brandeis's free speech reasoning marked a point of
stasis in his jurisprudential thinking. It suggested a new bar of unyielding
resistance in his psychological make-up, a profound change in his ideas about
both democracy and the courts,"' and a new and narrowing rigidity in his
constitutional thinking. Both would ultimately underwrite his later efforts in
both Dennis and The Bill of Rights.13 9
If Hand's thinking about judicial protection of speech rights seemed
increasingly rigid by the late 1920s, it ossified over the following two
decades. The process appeared nearly complete when he gave two speeches
a month apart in late 1942-the year of his final failure to gain a seat on the
Supreme Court. In the first, at a celebration of the 250th anniversary of the
founding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hand sounded an
alarm against unidentified but ominous threats to the independence of the
judiciary that he saw in demands for "a more loyal fealty to the popular
will."'4 ° He scorned the "dumb energy" generated by "vague stirrings of mass
feeling which many who pride themselves upon their democracy mistake for
the popular will."'' Although he left the exact source of the threats
distinctly lesser figure. While he might have continued to follow Holmes on the First Amendment,
he was less likely to do so with Brandeis. The fact that Hand regarded the two Justices quite
differently seemed apparent, for example, in his contradictory reactions to the decade's two
expansive new due process cases that divided Progressives, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In the former, Brandeis joined the
majority while Holmes dissented, and Hand rejected the Court's decision. Letter from Learned
Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard
Law Sch. (June 6, 1923), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 121; GUNTHER, supra
note 2, at 377 78. In the latter, Holmes joined the Court's opinion along with Brandeis, and Hand
announced, albeit with qualms, that he agreed with the decision. Letter from Learned Hand, Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Walter Lippmann (June 7, 1925), in REASON
AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 134; GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 378 80. Holmes noted his
dissent in Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403, but published his opinion on the issue in a companion case,
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923).
137. See supra notes 81 95 and accompanying text.
138. By the end of the 1920s Hand's thinking about democracy had diverged sharply from
Thayer's. See, e.g., HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities, supra note 72, at 73 76;
HAND, Is There a Common Will?, supra note 72, at 38 39; HAND, Sources of Tolerance, supra
note 72 at 55 56.
139. As early as 1930 Hand expressed his seeming resignation about the inability of the
courts to protect dissenters. HAND, Sources of Tolerance, supra note 72, at 55 56. "If a
community decides that some conduct is prejudicial to itself, and so decides by numbers sufficient
to impose its will upon dissenters, I know of no principle which can stay its hand." Id.
140. HAND, Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 120.
141. Id. at 119. Such efforts, he continued, come from "dumb energy." Id.
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unspecified, his warnings surely evoked memories of New Deal attacks on
the judiciary and especially Franklin Roosevelt's "Court packing" plan,
barely five years in the past.' Indeed, Hand made it clear that political power
lurked menacingly behind the threats. "To interject into the [judicial] process
the fear of displeasure or the hope of favor of those who can make their will
felt," he warned, "is inevitably to corrupt the event.""''4 To that potentially
lethal danger he announced that there was "but one answer: an unflinching
resistance."'44 That resistance, he then insisted, must take the form ofjudicial
adherence to one paramount principle: courts "should not have the last word
in those basic conflicts of 'right and wrong-between whose endless jar
justice resides.""'1 45 Against possibly fatal perils facing the courts, Hand
announced his implacable opposition and identified extreme judicial restraint
as the only effective defense possible. He seemed a man under siege.
A month later, on December 21, the second speech confirmed the
unyielding nature of Hand's now rigid constitutional thinking. Addressing a
Supreme Court memorial service for the recently deceased Brandeis, Hand
could not bring himself to comment on Brandeis's constitutional
jurisprudence or even mention his inspiring contributions to First
Amendment law. 46 Rather, at a memorial ceremony held at the Supreme
Court and convened to pay homage to one of the Court's truly great Justices,
Hand passed over the honoree's many landmark judicial contributions with
the announcement-seemingly inexplicable on any ground other than Hand's
adamant unwillingness to offer words of praise-that "this is no occasion to
appraise the life and work of the man whose memory we have met to
honor.' 141 Instead, he spoke generally about Brandeis's views on broad
142. Hand had deeply mixed feelings about Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan. He rejected
it as exceptionally dangerous but nonetheless saw it was wholly understandable in light of what
he regarded as the "political" decision-making of the "old" Court. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 453
60. His fears were likely stoked further by the rise of totalitarianism, the pressures World War II
imposed on the courts, and the continuing doctrinal turmoil that accompanied the New Deal's
"constitutional revolution."
143. HAND, Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 120.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 125. Hand quoted from a speech by Ulysses in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS
AND CRESSIDA, act 1, sc. 3.
146. When Hand gave a radio address in 1938 honoring Brandeis on the Justice's eighty-
second birthday, he mentioned Brandeis's legal contributions only briefly and refused to
commend or even nod to his First Amendment jurisprudence. Learned Hand, Justice Louis D.
Brandeis and the Good Life, 4 J. Soc. PHIL. 144, 144 (1938). He offered only the barest non-
committal comment that Brandeis had "his own technique" in dealing with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 145.
147. LEARNED HAND, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 127,
128. Hand seemed to have distinctively mixed feelings about Brandeis. On the positive side, he
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philosophical and cultural matters while alluding to his work on the Court
only obliquely and with undertones of disapproval.'48
admired Brandeis in some ways, including parts of his jurisprudence and especially his moral
"vision" of a society of small units and independent individuals. Hand, supra note 146, at 146.
Even when Hand spoke well of Brandeis, however, his comments sometimes seemed less than
whole-hearted. Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Jan. 21, 1942), microformed on
Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frames 872 74 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library). On the negative side, Hand seemed to harbor real
reservations about Brandeis as a judge. He bemoaned "Brandeis with his pretense of being
encyclopedic" in his opinions, Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Dec. 11, 1939),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frames 833 35 (Univ. Publ'ns of
Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), for example, and apparently disdained
Brandeis's opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Hand had been on the
panel below that Erie reversed, Tompkins v. Erie Railroad Co., 90 F.2d 603 (1937), and the
following year though not mentioning Erie he expressed concern about Court decisions "to
upset old precedents" and then declared that "the whole diversity jurisdiction is an utter mess."
Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Felix
Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 27, 1939), microformed on Felix
Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frames 837 38 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library). It seems likely that Hand shared the view of his cousin and
Second Circuit colleague, Judge Augustus N. Hand, who told Frankfurter that "I really do not like
the way [Erie] was handled by L.D.B." Letter from Augustus Noble Hand, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court
for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (May 10,
1938), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Part 3, Reel 3, Frames 912 13 (Univ. Publ'ns
of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see supra notes 115, 136.
148. HAND, supra note 147, at 128 33. Hand was aware that some thought his comments
inappropriate if not hostile. Remarking on his "Brandeis speech," he told Frankfurter that he had
suspected that Brandeis's "idolators might be displeased at having him said to be outside the main
current of his time." Letter from Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Mar. 8, 1943),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frames 903 09 (Univ. Publ'ns of
Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Hand dismissed their negative reaction
as the response of "gross creatures" and explained that his goal was merely to provide "an
understanding of the deeper nature of the man." Id. Although Frankfurter praised the speech
effusively Hand thought his words "extravagant," id. his long-delayed response to it
suggested that he, too, had serious concerns about it. Frankfurter pondered the speech for more
than two months before he finally wrote Hand about it, and then he confessed that he had been
forced to think long and hard before coming to his favorable conclusion. "Now that I have read
and reread and twice read aloud what you said at the Brandeis meeting here," Frankfurter began
cautiously, "it is about time that I said a word to you." Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc.
Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Mar. 4, 1943), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frame 901
(Univ. Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). He then told Hand
that he had concluded that the speech "truly conveyed the man" because it "conveyed that which
went to the heart of his greatest concern and his deepest reflection." Id. Accordingly, he wrote,
the speech filled him "with pride and joy." Id. Thus, it seems likely that Frankfurter had also been
disturbed by the speech and that he needed more than two months before he could work out a
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Four years later the result of Hand's jurisprudential ossification was fully
manifest. Addressing another memorial service at the Supreme Court, this
time for Harlan F. Stone, Hand praised the recently deceased Chief Justice as
a faithful follower of Thayer and a stalwart proponent of Thayer's principles
of judicial restraint. Whether "as teacher or as judge," Hand asserted, Stone
"believed with deep conviction" in Thayer's position and had followed its
prescriptions "with undeviating loyalty."'49 Even when New Dealers came to
dominate the Court and began favoring "personal rights" over "property"
rights, 5 ' Hand continued, Stone's "robust and loyal character" meant that he
would not join "an opportunistic reversion at the expense of his conviction as
to the powers of a court."'' In point of fact, Hand's claims about Stone were
shockingly inaccurate, denying Stone's paramount achievements in leading
the Court toward providing greater judicial protections for individual
rights.'52 As Hand well knew, Stone had written the Court's path-breaking
opinion in Carolene Products"3 and had inspired the Justices in the Flag
Salute cases, foundation stones for the Court's growing activism on behalf of
non-economic individual rights. "
Thus, by 1946 Hand's now iron-bound commitment to judicial
minimalism barred him from acknowledging the major achievements of both
serviceable interpretation. See id. His goal in writing Hand was apparently to use his flattering
technique to soften Hand, give the speech a positive spin, and counter the idea that there was a
significant split between Hand and Brandeis. Frankfurter had previously sought to maintain
cordial and sympathetic relations between the two. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(Feb. 16, 1939), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, at Part 3, Reel 26, Frame 832 (Univ.
Publ'ns of Am., Inc.) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
149. LEARNED HAND, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 152, 154. Thayer has "become the prophet of a new approach,"
Hand declared, and Stone "made no secret" of his allegiance to it. Id. Stone, Hand announced
quite inaccurately, "was throughout true to this view." Id. at 156.
150. Id. at 155 56.
151. Id. at 156.
152. John Frank concluded that Hand's arguments in The Bill of Rights "amount to a
systematic attack on the views of the late Chief Justice Stone." John P. Frank, Book Review, 32
TUL. L. REv. 790, 793 (1958).
153. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). On the far-reaching
significance of Carolene Products, see, for example, WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE
MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941 1953, at 116 42 (2006),
and on Stone's role in the case, see id. at 119 24.
154. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Stone, J., joining majority reversing
Gobitis); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). On
the Flag Salute Cases and Stone's role in them, see WIECEK, supra note 153, at 128 37. "Stone's
Gobitis dissent has established itself in the canon of libertarian thought on religious liberty." Id.
at 225.
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Brandeis and Stone and, further, from recognizing the extent to which Stone
had seemingly accepted Brandeis's implicit reinterpretation of Thayer's
principles.'55 The year after Hand's speech, resorting to exceptionally discrete
and understated language, Judge Wyzanski-one of Hand's ex-law clerks
and one of his great judicial admirers-acknowledged the salient truth. In his
remarks, Wyzanski noted, "Judge Hand revealed his own attitude perhaps
better than that of the Chief Justice.'
115 6
The change in Hand's thinking between the Progressive Era and World
War II was dramatic. Early in his career Hand had been willing to interpret
Thayer's "rule of the clear mistake" to support Progressive political goals. In
the middle of his career he was unwilling to interpret the rule to serve his
own-and Thayer's-honored goal of protecting the operations of free, open,
and informed democratic government. Late in his career he was unable even
to admit what Brandeis and Stone had done by interpreting Thayer's rule to
help justify and establish greater judicial protection for those rights.
Assuming that Hand valued free speech as highly as he continually
proclaimed, 15 those episodes charted an intellectual ossification that began
in the 1920s, reached its completion in the 1940s, and led to both his
restrictive First Amendment opinion in Dennis and his misconceived
constitutional vision in The Bill of Rights.158
155. Jerome Frank argued that Stone's opinion in Carolene Products represented an "explicit
restatement of Thayer" based on Thayer's stress on the need to protect "the public discussion of
policies" and ensure that "the people" maintained "that political maturity which democracy
required." Frank, supra note 106, at 691 92. In Stone's famous footnote four in Carolene
Products, he cited Brandeis's separate concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), where Brandeis argued that free speech was "essential to
effective democracy," id. at 377.
156. Wyzanski, supra note 10, at 356.
157. In 1943, in a federal antitrust prosecution against the Associated Press, Hand declared
that the publishing industry
serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news
from as many different sources, and with as many different facets and colors
as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as,
the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afid, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
158. The rigidity was apparent, for example, in his discussion of the First Amendment in The
Bill of Rights. He acknowledged that advocates of special judicial protection "have the better
argument so far as concerns Free Speech," HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 69, but
nonetheless held to his sweeping position negating the constitutional validity of such special
judicial protection. "I do not think that the interests mentioned in the First Amendment are entitled
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III. RECONSIDERING MASSES AND DENNIS
United States v. Dennis, Hand's widely publicized First Amendment
decision in 1950, upheld the prosecution of eleven leaders of the Communist
Party of the United States (CPUSA) under the Smith Act on the ground that
they conspired to advocate the use of force and violence to overthrow the
government. 5 9 In doing so, he applied an even weaker version of the Court's
already weak "clear and present danger" test. 6 ' Affirming defendants'
convictions, he declared that the proper test under the First Amendment was
"whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. ' That was
a far cry from the Holmes-Brandeis version of "clear and present danger" and
from his own "incitement" test as well.
62
The next year Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson announced the Supreme
Court's judgment affirming Hand's decision and defendants' conviction.1 63
His plurality opinion quoted Hand's weak formulation of the "clear and
present danger" test and expressly adopted it as the correct statement of the
law. 64 "As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as
in point of constitutional interpretation to a measure of protection different from other interests
... .Id. at56
159. 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For the general political
and legal background of the case, see William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic
Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375.
160. From the late 1920s to the mid-1940s the Court shifted toward a more protective view
of speech rights, but in the late 1940s it began to move back to a narrower and more repressive
approach. WIECEK, supra note 153, at 145 46; see also id. at 116-42. "[A] literal application of
the words 'clear and present danger' could easily support a decision that the advocacy of the
Communist Party leaders was protected speech." SCHICK, supra note 8, at 180.
161. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212. He later repeated the formula. Id. at 215. Hand wrote for
himself and Judge Thomas Swan. Id. at 205. Judge Harrie B. Chase concurred. Id. at 234.
162. Hand
explicitly stated that he was substituting his 'improbability' test for the
'remoteness' component of present danger, but the real impact of his new
formula came in the 'gravity' part of the equation. For under the Hand reading,
if a judge found an evil sufficiently menacing, its remoteness, improbability,
or likelihood could be severely reduced.
OWEN M. Fiss & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 559 (2006). The
"balancing" test in Dennis was "hardly what Holmes and Brandeis had in mind." STONE, supra
note 25, at 404. Hand's formulation "excised the main features of the original [clear and present
danger] test by eliminating or minimizing the requirement that the danger be immediate and
clear." Emerson, supra note 121, at 912.
163. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 494 (1951).
164. Id. at 510. In a 6 2 decision, Vinson wrote for Justices Stanley Reed, Harold Burton,
and Sherman Minton, id. at 495, while Justices Felix Frankfurter, id. at 517, and Robert Jackson,
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any other we might devise at this time," Vinson wrote. "It takes into
consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their
significances [sic].''165
While the differences in both reasoning and results between Hand's
opinions in Masses and Dennis were obvious, prominent scholars have
argued that those differences did not mean that Hand had changed his
personal views about free speech. First, they cite evidence from his letters
showing that he continued in private to defend his Masses "incitement" test,
that he disagreed with the government's prosecution in Dennis, and that he
had nothing but scorn for the extreme anticommunist fervor of the day.
166
Second, they maintain that Hand wrote his restrictive opinion in Dennis
because, "as a lower court judge," in Gunther's words, "he was bound by and
faithful to Supreme Court precedents.' 161 Charles Alan Wright agreed, adding
that Masses and Dennis both reflected Hand's principled deference to
Congress. In Masses Hand was free to base his decision on a congressional
statute and thereby defer to congressional intent, whereas in Dennis he was
asked to void a congressional statute, an act that his deferential approach
would not allow. 1
68
Geoffrey Stone reached similar conclusions 169  and, moreover,
strengthened the case for Hand's consistency. He argued that Hand's
interpretation of congressional intent in Masses was not strained but correct
and, consequently, that in both cases Hand had simply construed the
applicable statute properly.' 0 Further, he pointed out that "in Dennis, Hand
id. at 561, concurred separately. Justices Hugo Black, id. at 579, and William 0. Douglas, id. at
581, dissented.
165. Id. at 510 (majority opinion). "More we cannot expect from words," Vinson continued.
Id.
166. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 578 92, 603 05; Letter from Learned Hand to Felix
Frankfurter, supra note 133, at 306 07; STONE, supra note 25, at 401.
167. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 603 04. Schick argued similarly that Hand was relatively
free in Masses to shape the law but that in Dennis he was constrained by intervening Supreme
Court precedents. SCHICK, supra note 8, at 179.
168. Accord SCHICK, supra note 8, at 179; see Wright, supra note 8, at 1850. The point
arguably receives support from a passage in The Bill of Rights. See HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 11, at 9 10. During his more than fifty years on the bench Hand voted to strike down
parts of only three statutes, two federal and one state. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 451 53. Of
the two federal laws, one was United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d
Cir. 1935), which involved a statute that the Supreme Court subsequently struck down on broader
grounds than the Second Circuit had invoked. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
169. See STONE, supra note 25, at 398-402.
170. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 335, 335 (2003). Contra RABBAN, supra note 25, at 249 55. The
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makes clear that, in his view, Masses required affirmance of the
convictions."'' Hand found that the Dennis defendants had expressly
advocated unlawful conduct, and consequently his "incitement" test-even
had it been the law-would not have protected them.' 2
Those arguments make a plausible case for Hand's consistency, and yet
they seem unduly formal and critically incomplete. Largely abstract and
legalistic in nature, they elide the underlying realities of time, context, human
motivation, and Hand's own words.' That lack simplifies our understanding
of Hand's behavior and, more important, risks obscuring our understanding
of American constitutionalism.
"legislative history of the Espionage Act, which Hand never cited in his opinion, demonstrates
the congressional intent to publish the very kind of antiwar material that prompted the postmaster
to declare The Masses 'nonmailable."' Id. at 265. The passage of the Sedition Act the next year
suggests that Rabban may have the better of the argument. It shows that, whatever Congress
intended in June of 1917, by May of 1918 it clearly intended to use the mail to punish the
"disloyal." The later act strengthened the earlier measure's mail provisions by authorizing the
Postmaster General to deny mail deliveries to those who violated the act. RICHARD POLENBERG,
FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 34 (1987). In an
earlier piece, I argued that Hand narrowed the reach of the Espionage Act by infusing his own
values into its construction. Purcell, supra note 70, at 897 98, 913. Weinstein notes more
cautiously that "Hand's decision to rest his decision on statutory interpretation rather than the
First Amendment might have been strategically motivated by the outcome he wanted to reach."
Weinstein, supra note 19, at 70 n.40.
171. STONE, supra note 25, at 401.
172. Id. at 401 02. Justice Robert Jackson seemed to agree, concurring in Dennis and quoting
the Masses incitement test to reject defendants' First Amendment claim. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 495, 571 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
As aptly stated by Judge Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten:
'One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands. Words
are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and those which
have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of
interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of
government in a democratic state.'
Id. (citation omitted). To the extent that Stone and Jackson were right, Hand's application of his
"incitement" test in Dennis severely shrinks its doctrinal importance and protective reach, leaving
considerable room for government suppression. Not everyone agrees, however, that Hand
properly applied the Masses test in Dennis. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 442.
173. Legal commentators gave little attention to the possibility that Hand himself had
changed, and they seemed to minimize the influence of contemporary political and cultural
pressures on him. Stone noted the influence of those pressures on the Supreme Court in Dennis,
STONE, supra note 25, at 410 11, but he seemed to pass over their possible influence on Hand.
Id. at 398 402. Gunther also seemed to suggest that they had little influence on Hand. See
GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 598 612. Schick similarly discounted those factors and stressed the
consistency of Hand's decision in Dennis with his deferential judicial philosophy. See SCHICK,
supra note 8, at 176 87.
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The Hand of 1917 was not the Hand of 1950, as Part II argued, 17 and the
United States in the later year was hardly the United States in the earlier one.
In 1917, when Hand wrote Masses, Progressives remained optimistic and
enthusiastic about expanded possibilities for reform, and many welcomed the
war as an exciting opportunity to remake both American society and
potentially the world. 17 By 1950 Americans had witnessed the collapse of
the old Progressive movement, the destructive impact of what they called
"The Great War," a post-war depression and Red Scare, a decade-long and
even more devastating "Great Depression," a Second World War that proved
far more costly and destructive than the First, the stunning development of
nuclear weapons and their acquisition by the Soviet Union, the rapid spread
of an anti-Communist fervor accompanied by public and private efforts at
domestic repression, an accelerating Cold War with the Soviet Union that
threatened a nuclear conflict far more terrifying than anything Americans had
previously thought possible, and finally a new and bitterly controversial war
in far-away Korea that brought the looming possibility of a broader and
potentially disastrous war with China. Those overwhelming developments
profoundly changed American attitudes, understandings, perceptions, and
fears. 176
In the context of those sweeping developments, Hand's ideas had changed
not only in the ways already noted but also in a more specific way. After
World War II he became a committed and fearful Cold Warrior. Although he
disdained extreme anti-Communism,' 77 he had nothing but contempt for
Communism itself. It was an irrational "living faith" that was "Saturnine and
174. See supra Part II.
175. Hand wrote his opinion three months after the United States declared war on Germany.
"Instead of interruption, World War I brought the extraordinary culmination of the progressive
movement. U.S. participation in the Great War gave progressives their 'heart's desire' the best
opportunity they ever had to remake the nation along progressive lines." MICHAEL MCGERR, A
FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870
1920, at 280 81 (2003); accord ALAN DAWLEY, CHANGING THE WORLD: AMERICAN
PROGRESSIVES IN WAR AND REVOLUTION 147 50 (2003); ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR
JUSTICE: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE 214 15 (1991); Allen F. Davis,
Welfare, Reform and World WarI, 19 Am. Q. 516, 517 19 (1967).
176. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929 1945 (1999); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES, 1945 1974 (1996). On anti-Communism in America after World War II, see, for
example, DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND
EISENHOWER (1978); ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE
SENATE (1970); MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND MCCARTHY: THE RADICAL
SPECTER (1967).
177. Hand detested the era's anti-Communist "witch hunts" and in 1952 publicly denounced
Senator Joseph McCarthy and his tactics. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 588 89.
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false," he declared, and it led people to "the hairy embraces of that strangest
of all strange deities, the enraged egoist, Karl Marx.""'8 More immediately
compelling, Hand feared the Soviet Union. As early as 1946 he confessed
that he was "full of trepidation" about the threat it posed to America and the
world, and a year later he explained that he was "gloomier than ever about
Soviet intransigence."' 9 It "will only take three or four months of Russian
occupation of Europe," he wrote privately in July 1950, "to extinguish all that
we draw on for our spiritual sustenance."'' 0
Hand's Dennis opinion made clear that he not only recognized the Soviet
Union as a powerful and dangerous international adversary but also saw the
CPUSA as a dire and immediate threat to the United States. The party's
conspiracy, he wrote, "creates a danger of the utmost gravity."'' Moreover,
the potentially lethal threat it posed was sufficiently imminent to justify
government efforts to suppress it. "We do not understand how one could ask
for a more probable danger, unless we must wait till the actual eve of
hostilities."'82 Keenly and anxiously, Hand felt an overweening danger, and
he steeled himself to confront it. Eight years earlier the "dumb energy"
driving "the popular will" had convinced him of the need for "unflinching
resistance," and now the CPUSA did the same.'83 Americans, he declared in
Dennis, "must not flinch at the challenge." '84 He feared not just the Soviet
178. Letter from Learned Hand, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
to Bernard Berenson (Jan. 8, 1950), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 286 87.
179. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 577, 578. For Hand's attitudes toward the early Cold War
and McCarthyism, see id. at 577 92, and for his related judicial work, see id. at 592 629.
180. Letter from Learned Hand, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
to Walter Lippmann (July 18, 1950), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 291.
181. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950). "Our democracy, like any
other, must meet that [Communist] faith and that creed on the merits, or it will perish." Id. at 212.
182. Id. at 213.
183. HAND, Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 119, 120. See supra
note 59.
184. Dennis, 183 F.2d at212.
The American Communist Party, of which the defendants are the controlling
spirits, is a highly articulated, well contrived, far spread organization,
numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined, many of
whom are infused with a passionate Utopian faith that is to redeem mankind.
It has its Founder, its apostles, its sacred texts-perhaps even its martyrs. It
seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of schooling, demanding
of all an inflexible doctrinal orthodoxy.
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Union and world Communism but, like most Americans, the small and
generally despised CPUSA as well.'85
Equally significant, Hand was not actually "bound" in Dennis by
controlling Supreme Court precedents. The Court's various First Amendment
opinions were neither sufficiently clear nor sufficiently consistent to require
him to interpret the "clear and present danger" doctrine as he did.'86 Geoffrey
Stone, for example, has maintained that "in the thirty years since World War
I, the Court had moved decidedly toward the Holmes-Brandeis approach,
under which the convictions in Dennis would clearly have to be reversed."' 8
In his Dennis opinion Hand acknowledged the law's shift toward a more
welcoming view of free speech, noting that the "Supreme Court has certainly
evinced a tenderness towards political utterances since the First World
War."' 88 Then he worked his way through an extended and "wearisome
analysis"'89 of the Court's precedents and, as Gunther noted, "found no clear
guidance there."' 90 Repeatedly, his opinion explained that the available
precedents had little or no relevance to the issue he faced.' 9 ' Thus, he had
185. Hand "emerged as deeply biased in favor of the prevailing political assumptions of the
day." CAUTE, supra note 176, at 193. His language "boded ill for judicial impartiality; in Hand's
Cold-War diatribe the judiciary merely fused its values and its criteria of judgment with those of
the President and Congress, of the aggravated patria." Id. at 194. The CPUSA was under
widespread and fierce attack in the late 1940s and 1950s. See, e.g., THEODORE DRAPER,
AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND SOVIET RUSSIA: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD 430 (1960); MICHAEL J.
HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE, 1945 1954, at 315 16 (1998); LISLE A. ROSE, THE COLD WAR COMES TO MAIN STREET:
AMERICA IN 1950, at 217 21 (1999); DAVID A. SHANNON, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
COMMUNISM: A HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945, at 317
19 (1959). Further, the party was struggling under internal divisions. See JOSEPH R. STAROBIN,
AMERICAN COMMUNISM IN CRISIS, 1943 1957, at 197 205 (1972).
186. "While it is true that the Court did not fully explain the relationship of 'gravity' to the
other elements of the test, it never suggested that the gravity of the evil was to be weighed against
the imminence of the danger." KALVEN, supra note 110, at 198.
187. STONE, supra note 25, at 402; accord id. at 236 38, 396.
188. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 207. On appeal, Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion announcing
the Court's judgment acknowledged the same point: "Although no case subsequent to Whitney
and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is little doubt that
subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis rationale." Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951).
189. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
190. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 600. As Stone put it, "the Court's precedents in this area
were hardly crystalline." STONE, supra note 25, at 402.
191. Hand canvassed almost every possibly relevant precedent and found none clearly
applicable or particularly helpful. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 207 12. "It does not seem to us
therefore that these decisions help towards a solution here," he wrote about one group of cases.
Id. at 209. Several other precedents "throw no light" on the issue, id., while other "cases are not
helpful here." Id. at 210. Of the last case he considered, the Supreme Court's most recent free
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sufficient leeway to construe the Court's precedents to establish a more
demanding First Amendment standard.'92 He could, for example, have given
far more "weight" to the importance of "free speech" itself,'93 required that a
danger be "imminent" rather than merely "probable," and treated the
"gravity" of a danger and its "imminence" as independent variables to be
considered separately rather than as dependent variables to be balanced
against one another.'94
speech case, American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), he wrote
that "[w]e do not pretend" that it "is authoritative here." Dennis, 183 F.2d at 211. "What we do
say is that no longer can there be any doubt, if indeed there was before, that the phrase, 'clear and
present danger,' is not a slogan or shibboleth to be applied as though it carried its own meaning."
Id. at 212.
192. Although by the time he wrote Dennis there were many Court precedents on First
Amendment speech issues, they did not necessarily constrain Hand beyond establishing that the
label of the proper constitutional test was "clear and present danger," not "incitement." As Hand
argued in Dennis, however, those precedents did not make the meaning of "clear and present
danger" apparent, nor did they determine how it should be applied to the defendants. The phrase,
he wrote immediately before his formulation of its meaning, "is a way to describe a penumbra of
occasions, even the outskirts of which are indefinable, but within which, as is so often the case,
the courts must find their way as they can." Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
193. Even assuming that the legal test was one of "balancing," that did not determine what
elements were to be "balanced," the "weight" each was to be given, or the relation among them.
Hand's failure to place the values of free speech more heavily into the scales was puzzling given
both his repeated statements about its importance and his personal view that the prosecution and
conviction of defendants was unwise and even potentially harmful. "Personally I should never
have prosecuted those birds: 'the blood of martyrs is the seed of the church.' So far as all this will
do anything, it will encourage the faithful and maybe help the Committee on Propaganda." Letter
from Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter, supra note 133, at 306; accord Letter from Learned
Hand, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Augustus Noble Hand, Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Aug. 8, 1950), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra
note 3, at 294. Those considerations suggested additional reasons why Hand should have given
greater weight to the importance of protecting free speech.
194. In the most recent Court precedent, Douds, 339 U.S. at 411, the Court spoke of
"balancing," and from that Hand inferred that the proper "clear and present danger" test "involves
in every case a comparison between interests which are to be appraised qualitatively." Dennis,
183 F.2d at 212. That conclusion ("interests" to be "appraised qualitatively") highlighted the
subjective nature of the test that was ostensibly required, and it hardly mandated the test as Hand
stated and applied it. Douds did not require him to minimize the evil of an "invasion of free
speech," id., nor did it require his findings regarding either the "gravity" or the "probability" of
the danger at issue. Further, it did not require him to substitute "probability" for "imminence."
Finally, Douds specified neither all of the "interests" to be included in the analysis nor the
"weight" each interest was to have. "Unlike Brandeis in Whitney, who maintained that the gravity
of the evil should be considered only after its imminence had been demonstrated, Hand 'purposely
substituted 'improbability' for 'remoteness' and used gravity as a 'mutually interdependent'
factor to be balanced against improbability, not as an independent test." RABBAN, supra note 25,
at 377.
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Hand, moreover, knew how to shape precedents and doctrines to accord
more closely with his own views of wisdom, efficacy, and propriety. Even if
he had not infused his own value judgments into his Masses opinion,'95 on
both the district and circuit courts he had interpreted unsettled law, unclear
rules, and unhelpful precedents in ways that brought new direction and
substance to many areas of the law.'96 Indeed, those achievements were
precisely why so many commentators called him a "great" judge and
repeatedly hailed him for shaping the law wisely and well.
Thus, in Dennis Hand had the opportunity to strengthen or weaken First
Amendment law.'9 As he had repeatedly declared, judges had to make
choices, and they often had considerable discretion in doing so.'98 A judge,
195. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 158.
196. Hand
had a high respect for precedent, but was unwilling that courts or at least
courts of last resort should move only within the stated limits of precedent.
His tributes to tradition were coupled, as often as not, with encouragement of
experiment and change. His was the middle way. In his intellectual humility,
he knew that his solution was not necessarily superior to the wisdom of the
past, and yet he knew that if we are to progress, we must move by what light
we have.
THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING, supra note 8, at 17. For discussions of ways in which Hand's
ideas helped alter or shape the law in other areas, see, for example, GUNTHER, supra note 2, at
138 (patents); id. at 148 51 (obscenity); id at 612 25 (criminal conviction); id. at 629 38
(naturalization); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440,473 74 (1968) (Hand "was a system-builder, whatever he may have
declared to the contrary," and he made a "persistent effort to rationalize the administrative
process"); Cox, supra note 67, at 370 (Hand changes established approaches to statutory
interpretation); Orrin G. Judd, Judge Learned Hand and the Criminal Law, 60 HARV. L. REV.
405, 407 (1947) (noting Hand makes decisions though "recognizing that there was authority to
the contrary"). For a somewhat different argument that Hand was a particularly "obedient" judge,
see SCHICK, supra note 8, at 154 91, and, for the same point, Wyzanski, supra note 10, at 352
54.
197. Hand was sufficiently adroit to even have found a way to state a more protective test
while, at the same time, upholding defendants' convictions. His adoption of a test balancing
"gravity" and "probability," however, made such a result much more difficult, and the fact that
he framed such a balancing test suggests that he was determined to uphold the convictions because
of his intense fear of the Communist danger. Seven years later Justice John Marshall Harlan
demonstrated how Hand could have gone even farther and reversed defendants' convictions on
the basis of arguably established rules and precedents, including a narrowed concept of
"incitement." See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 27 (1957); see also STONE, supra
note 25, at 413 15 (suggesting a parallel between Harlan's approach and Hand's in Masses, at
414). In Yates, the Court did not decide on the basis of the "clear and present danger" test. 354
U.S. at 303 n.2.
198. From his early years on the bench Hand understood that judges were often required to
choose between plausible alternatives. They are, he wrote in 1916, "charged with the
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he explained several years after Dennis, must strive for "complete personal
detachment" but must also "have as much imagination as is possible."'99 Like
the poet and sculptor, the judge "has some vague purposes and he has an
indefinite number of what you might call frames of preference among which
he must choose; for choose he has to, and he does."2 ' Indeed, in Dennis he
reiterated his claim that "choose we must." '' Then, he chose to weaken First
Amendment law, not strengthen it.2"2
In neither Masses nor Dennis did Hand's choice flow simply from an
eternal and unchanging jurisprudence, whether one committed to free speech
or judicial deference. Rather, both were products of a judge at two quite
different times in his life, of two quite different historical contexts, and of a
decision made many years earlier to reject Brandeis's democracy-based free
speech jurisprudence. Hand's Masses opinion in 1917 was a product of the
open-ended pragmatism he learned from William James, an enthusiastic
embrace of a buoyant Progressive spirit, an instinctive appreciation of the
intellectually exciting nature of The Masses, and a heady flirtation with a new
jurisprudential ideal that was activist, forward looking, justice oriented, and
in accord with what he believed was a new and "genuine social ideal."2 3
responsibility of choosing but of choosing well." HAND, The Speech of Justice, supra note 59, at
15; see HAND, Mr. Justice Holmes, supra note 74, at 21 ("In the end, and quite fairly, a judge will
be estimated in terms of his outlook and his nature. He cannot evade responsibility for his beliefs,
because there are at bottom the creatures of his choice").
199. PROCEEDINGS OF A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT TO COMMEMORATE FIFTY YEARS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE BY THE
HONORABLE LEARNED HAND, reprinted in 264 F.2d 1, 28 (2d Cir. 1959) (separate pagination
from the cases reported in the volume).
200. Id. at 29.
201. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
202. Hand's opinion "provided a speech-repressive precedent that undercut the libertarian
potential of clear-and-present-danger and set back the First Amendment momentum by twenty
years." WIECEK, supra note 153, at 558. "The First Amendment simply cannot stand on the
shifting foundation of ad hoc evaluations of specific threat[s]." ELY, supra note 42, at 109. The
"'balancing' test has tended to reduce the first amendment [sic], especially when a legislative
judgment is weighed in the balance, to a limp and lifeless formality." Emerson, supra note 121,
at 877. "Such an unstructured inquiry invariably lends itself to ideological manipulation," and the
"very ambiguity of the standard creates an intolerable uncertainty of application and a potent
chilling effect on free expression." STONE, supra note 25, at 409; accord RABBAN, supra note 25,
at 376 78. Anthony Lewis sought to exonerate Hand while at the same time acknowledging that
he weakened First Amendment law. "Hand felt obliged to follow the Holmes approach, though
his version of it was much weaker than what was intended by Holmes .... ANTHONY LEWIS,
FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 122
(2007).
203. HAND, The Speech of Justice, supra note 59, at 15; see Purcell, supra note 70, at 900
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More than thirty years later his opinion in Dennis was a product of profound
personal and contextual changes. His pragmatism had grown brittle and
timid, and the other factors that had inspired him in Masses had long
disappeared from his life. In their place were constraining personal
experiences and a more threatening world that together had combined to
chasten his optimism, deepen his skepticism, narrow his faith in the
possibilities of democratic government, and strengthen his convictions about
the primacy of social stability and the necessity of political acquiescence.
Those changes channeled his thinking in Dennis, and as a result he chose to
put a relatively restrictive interpretation on the law, an interpretation that
would not only uphold the conviction of the Communist defendants but also
limit more generally the scope the law would allow to political dissenters.
In 1950, Hand was not free as a matter of law to apply his Masses
"incitement" test as such, but he was free to make the "clear and present
danger" test far more protective than he did. He chose to do the opposite.
Regardless of whether he continued to believe in the superiority of his
"incitement" test as a personal matter, his views and values-and his
performance as a judge-had changed. Those changes altered his perceptions
of both free speech and the world, and together they reshaped the way he
would explore, state, and apply the law.2"4
Masses and Dennis together have their most enduring historical
significance, then, because they exemplify the unavoidable press of personal
viewpoints and historical contexts and because they illustrate the unavoidable
processes of constitutional change. They spotlight the fact that principles
neither articulate nor define themselves and that their shaping, selection,
interpretation, and application always take place "in history" and through the
medium of individual minds." 5 They demonstrate that understanding
American constitutionalism and its laws requires constant attention to those
factors which are too often ignored or minimized in the quest for clear,
204. In the actual circumstances of 1950, it seemed highly unlikely that the American
Communist Party could threaten in any serious way to overthrow the United States government
or to do so in the foreseeable future. Further, in spite of the party's teaching about the inevitability
of a proletarian revolution, it did not advocate any unlawful actions at the time or in the near
future. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 517 18.
205. Posner's comment on Hand's Dennis opinion was harsh but accurate. The opinion was
"a period piece," Posner wrote, and "we might expect of a judge of Hand's ability something
more than the conventional wisdom of his time and place." Posner, supra note 5, at 517 18.
Ironically, after World War I, referring to the work of "their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder
Statesmen," Hand declared that the Justices had "not shown themselves wholly immune from the
'herd instinct' and noted that "what seems 'immediate and direct' to-day may seem very remote
next year even though the circumstances surrounding the utterance be unchanged." Gunther,
supra note 33, at 770.
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controlling, authoritative, and unchanging constitutional theories and
doctrines. The tensions between "law" and "history" and between legal
reasoning and social realities raise serious and unavoidable normative
questions,2"6 and understanding those tensions and grappling intelligently
with those questions is essential to ensuring the vitality, integrity and efficacy
of American constitutionalism.2"
Understood in historical context, then, Masses and Dennis-and
Brandenberg as well-sound a grave warning. Changing times and contexts
always generate new pressures, and those pressures may create new and
sometimes particularly dangerous threats to individual rights, democratic
government, and the rule not just "of law" but "of fair and decent law.2"8 In
his book Perilous Times Geoffrey Stone identified that lesson for First
Amendment law,2"9  but the lesson applies equally to American
constitutionalism in general. There can be no end to the story of either free
speech or open democratic government, for changing times and contexts will
always bring ominous new challenges to both, challenges that mere words-
however noble, comforting, or unchanging-cannot by themselves meet and
successfully overcome.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Masses and Dennis marked changes in Hand's constitutional thinking, as
did The Bill of Rights which was far more rigid and extreme that Hand's view
of the judiciary in the years before World War I. Beyond representing change,
however, The Bill of Rights illustrated quite sharply both the rigidification of
his thinking and the shaping power of historical context and personal values.
The book is particularly revealing in the latter regard, moreover, because
Hand purposely strove to present his views as the pure and spare product of
the most rigorous constitutional logic. It was a work ostensibly based on
206. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 299 (1990); David L.
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 731 32 (1987).
207. The evolution of First Amendment law from the New Deal to the present illustrates
many of the tensions between "law" and "history" and some of the ways the latter continually
remolds the former, bringing complicated, unanticipated, and sometimes deeply controversial
results. See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 2002 04 (2016); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1453, 1456 58 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. REV. 133, 135
38 (2016).
208. For an analysis of the impact of historical context and change on ideas about free speech,
see, for example, GRABER, supra note 23, at 3 15.
209. STONE, supra note 25, at 523 25.
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"unanswerable" propositions that led to timelessly correct conclusions.210
That facade of Olympian truth, however, could not conceal the extent to
which the book was a deeply personal effort rooted in its author's specific
time, context, and individual beliefs. An examination of The Bill of Rights,
then, suggests that normative constitutional theories-however abstract,
"logical," and ostensibly "timeless" in form-cannot escape the cabining
limitations of history.
A. Time and Context in The Bill of Rights
Most apparent, several immediate historical factors shaped The Bill of
Rights. Perhaps most fundamental was Hand's acute awareness of the
professional expectations he had aroused by agreeing to give the prestigious
Holmes Lectures and his consequent decision to present the lectures as a
grand jurisprudential valedictory. That, in turn, led to two other equally
fateful decisions. One was his decision to focus on constitutional theory
rather than on any of the other subjects he had written about over the decades
and could have likely addressed with greater subtlety and nuance; the other
was his determination to lay out a general constitutional theory and support
it with "logically airtight arguments," a goal wholly inappropriate to the
subject he chose.2 ' A more specific factor was Felix Frankfurter's
desperate-and ultimately successful-effort to convince him that Brown v.
Board of Education1 2 was not based on the general principle that race-based
laws violated the Equal Protection Clause."3 Frankfurter's misleading reports
210. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 10, 51. Hand's legal philosophy "was
timely when he preached it and yet was imbued with a sure timelessness, transcending in
importance even his most significant decisions." SCHICK, supra note 8, at 156.
211. Hand was "obsessed by his drive to produce logically airtight arguments" and that drive
led him to articulate "a more rigid, more negative view of judicial power than any he had ever
voiced before." GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 671. Interestingly, Hand's goal was identical to the
approach he took in Masses. In both he sought to articulate a test that would be, as he said of his
earlier opinion, "hard, conventional, difficult to evade." Gunther, supra note 33, at 770. If that
approach was fruitful for his earlier purpose, it proved stultifying for his later one.
212. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional).
For Hand's assessment, see HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 54 55.
213. Fearful of Southern anger, intransigence, and violence, Frankfurter was determined to
stop the Court from hearing challenges to anti-miscegenation laws. If Brown were recognized as
establishing the general principle that racial categories were constitutionally prohibited, he
believed, it would force the Court to invalidate such laws. That, in turn, would infuriate the South
and cause untold damage to the Court and the country. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 665 72;
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 158 62 (1983); see, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme
Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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and repeated exhortations were largely responsible for Hand's unfortunate
and negative treatment of Brown.214 Another related factor was Hand's
confused understanding, or perhaps even inexplicable ignorance, of the
Court's per curiam desegregation decisions that followed Brown, a factor that
made him acutely vulnerable to Frankfurter's urging.215 Finally, one last
factor cannot be disregarded. Lurking in the back of Hand's mind may have
been concerns about his still recent and increasingly criticized opinion in
Dennis, an opinion that he felt conflicting needs to defend, clarify, and to
some extent disclaim.
21 6
(Sept. 8, 1957), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 374 75; Letter from Felix
Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Sept. 17, 1957), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra
note 3, at 376 77; Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Sept. 27, 1957), in
REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 379 80; Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S., to Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Oct. 12, 1957), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 381 82.
214. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 54 55. The arid rigidity of Hand's
thinking was apparent in his refusal to consider or even mention two overshadowing facts about
Brown. One was that the Court had almost surely exercised a practical prudence in distinguishing
Plessy v. Ferguson rather than overruling it. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 92, 494
95 (1954). The other was that, even assuming that Brown's holding was limited, it had nonetheless
ignited race-based tumult that had been dominating the national headlines. In addition to vigorous
and sometimes violent resistance throughout the South, at the very time Hand was preparing and
delivering his lectures two race-based crises were reaching their peak. In Congress, Southern
representatives were pushing legislation to retaliate against the Court for its decision in Brown,
and in Little Rock, Arkansas, a riotous school desegregation battle had forced a reluctant president
to send in the 101st Airborne Division to ensure order. For Hand, those considerations were
apparently irrelevant. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 660 62; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 326
28, 398 400 (2004); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 79 80, 91 95 (1962). See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT
LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971).
215. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 670.
216. The Bill of Rights justifies Hand's deferential behavior in Dennis, HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 9 11, 56, while at the same time both suggesting doubts about the law
he stated there, id. at 58 60, and acknowledging the practical value ofjudicial review in protecting
free speech rights, id. at 69. Hand's private letters show that he continued to believe that his
Masses opinion offered a sounder test for First Amendment issues and that he was uneasy with
his Dennis test. See Letter from Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter, supra note 133, at 306; Letter
from Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Elliot
Richardson (Feb. 29, 1952), in REASON AND IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 311 12; and Letter
from Learned Hand, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to Charles
Wyzanski, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass. (Apr. 13, 1952), in REASON AND
IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 314 16.
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Time and context also marked many of the book's basic assumptions.
Hand's concepts of federalism and separation of powers, for example,
appeared rigid and formalistic, and they lacked insight into the complexities
that more recent scholarship has illuminated. On federalism, Hand blinked
the fact that federal judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights represented not
just a "judicial" power but also a "national" power.2 ' That power functioned
not only as a limit on governmental power, as Hand recognized,218 but also as
an instrument capable of magnifying national powers over the states-
legislative and executive as well as judicial.2" 9 Thus, Hand missed what later
scholarship recognized as a central dynamic of federal judicial review.2 On
separation of powers, his position seemed equally outmoded. Judicial review
"invaded" the separation of powers, he declared, terming that assertion "to
217. "I am not concerned with those decisions that have marked the division between the
powers of the nation and of the states, for the 'Bill of Rights' is concerned only with the protection
of the individual against the impact of federal or state law." HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 31; see also id. at 1 (seeming to treat judicial review of "statutes of Congress, or of the
States, or acts of the President" as involving equal issues subject to the same standards); id. at 13
15 (discussing judicial review of federal "Departments" and including "the states"); id. at 31
(equating question of judicial review of state and federal actions).
218. Id. at 31, 33.
219. Obvious examples coming in the decade after Hand wrote include Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 05 (1964) (upholding power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in interstate commerce); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 325 26 (1966) (upholding power of Congress under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment to impose restrictions on state power to control voting rights); and Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 47 (1966) (upholding power of Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws protecting minority voting rights). See, e.g., LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 487 88 (2000) (describing how the
Warren Court enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment sought to make
racial policies of Southern states conform to new national standards and values); Michael J.
Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REv. 48, 48 49 (2000)
(describing early cases enforcing Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment in criminal cases
linked closely to reaction against racial injustice in South).
220. Contemporary scholarship has made it clear that modern "federalism" is an
exceptionally complex system involving intertwined relations between the ostensibly "separate"
levels and branches of government. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 7 (2007)
("The idea of American federalism as a simple binary division between 'the nation' and 'the
states,' then, is an artificial abstraction unrelated to the actual history and operations of the
nation's constitutional system."); ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 350
(2011) ("Indeed, the important interpretative roles by political actors in vertical federalism
bargaining are enhanced by the horizontal check of judicial review."); Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1957 (2014) ("Taking administration and politics seriously
ultimately points not to preservation of traditional conceptions of federalism, but instead to a new
anti-essentialist view of states and their role in our compound republic.").
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my mind an unanswerable" proposition.22' That proposition, however, was
easily answerable, and historical studies have convincingly done so. They
have demonstrated that at the founding the doctrine of separation of powers
was so vague, unsettled, and contested that it could not have supported any
conclusive argument, let alone one that was "unanswerable." '222 Further, the
only proposition about the doctrine that was truly "unanswerable"
contradicted Hand's assertion. It was apparent, after all, that the Constitution
adopted separation of powers in a specially modified form that partially
blended the diverse and "separated" powers of the federal branches in order
to create a complex new system of checks and balances.223 Thus, "invasions"
of the separated powers of the three branches were literally built into the
Constitution's structure.
Similarly, time and context marked Hand's declaration that the power of
judicial review "is not a logical deduction from the structure of the
Constitution but only a practical condition upon its successful operation." '224
True, judicial review was not a necessary "logical deduction," but it was
manifestly one that was eminently "logical." '225  Herbert Wechsler
demonstrated that point a year after Hand wrote,226 and a decade later Charles
Black showed at great length that "the method of inference from the
221. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 10 11.
222. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation ofPowers: Some Early Versions and Practices,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 261 (1989); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE L.J. 1725, 1755 (1996); Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early National Period,
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269,270 71 (1989).
223. Madison repeatedly made the point that the Constitution's structural "inventions of
prudence" created multiple institutions with partially overlapping powers that would enable them
to check and balance one another. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 337 (James Madison) (Edward
Mead Earle ed., 1937); see THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314 15 (James Madison) (Edward Mead
Earle ed., 1937); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed.,
1937).
224. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 15. "The arguments deducing the court's
authority [of judicial review] from the structure of the new government, or from the implications
of any government, were not valid, in spite of the deservedly revered names of their authors." Id.
at 28.
225. The Federalist Papers, for example, suggested the importance of such "structural"
reasoning. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NoS. 9, 22, 78 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 39, 48 (James
Madison). Hand was, of course, well aware of The Federalist, and in The Bill of Rights he
discounted Hamilton's argument in Number 78 by distinguishing constitutional judicial review
from the inference Hamilton drew based on "the ordinary function of courts to construe statutes."
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 7 11. Hand did not address the broader structural
arguments that both Hamilton and Madison advanced in their various essays.
226. Wechsler, supra note 42, 3 5.
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structures and relationships created by the constitution [sic]" '22 can logically
support the practice of judicial review while helpfully illuminating the
substantive interests and values at issue in its exercise.228 The Court itself,
moreover, has frequently advanced arguments based on constitutional
structure. "Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise
question," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, resolution "must be sought in
historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and
in the jurisprudence of this Court." '229 One can contest the merits of any
particular structural argument,23 but Hand's flat assertion that structural
arguments did not allow any "logical deduction" supporting judicial review
was simply unfounded and has, by and large, long been abandoned.23'
Again, time and context dated Hand's assumption that judicial review was
an anti-majoritarian practice. 2 While the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" in
constitutional theory remains a subject of debate,233 there is virtually no basis
227. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7
(1969). "On the whole, there is nothing in our entire governmental structure which has a more
leak-proof claim to legitimacy than the function of the courts in reviewing state acts for federal
constitutionality." Id. at 74.
228. For example, the "textual method, in some cases, forces us to blur the focus and talk
evasively, while the structural method frees us to talk sense." Id. at 13. "I am inclined to think
well of the method of reasoning from structure and relation ... because to succeed it has to make
sense current, practical sense. The textual-explication method ... contains within itself no
guarantee that it will make sense." Id. at 22.
229. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). For further references to the
majority's structural argument in Printz, see id. at 918, 921, 932. Similarly, in Alden v. Maine the
Court relied for its decision on "history, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution." 527
U.S. 706, 760 (1999). For other examples of the judicial acceptance of structural arguments, see
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 50 (2000); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 217 18
(1995); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859 60 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
230. In Printz, 521 U.S. at 955, 961, for example, Justice Stevens dissented from the
majority's structural reasoning. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737, 743, 785, 797
(2008) (majority invoking structural argument) and id. at 826, 833 (Scalia, J., dissenting (rejecting
structural argument).
231. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 227, at 72 75; accord ELY, supra note 42, at 12 ("[T]he
theory one employs to supply that [specific] content should be derived from the general themes
of the entire constitutional document and not from some source entirely beyond its four comers.").
"Respecting the general technique of bringing the document's broader themes to bear on the
resolution of specific questions," Ely wrote, "I have been importantly influenced by C. Black,
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969)." Id. at 225 n.48.
232. Judicial review contradicted "the presuppositions of popular government to vest in a
chamber, unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power to suppress social experiments which it
does not approve." HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 73.
233. The term was discussed and popularized in BICKEL, supra note 36, at 16. The idea has a
long history. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The
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today for rejecting judicial review on the ground that it is simply "anti-
majoritarian. '234 Overwhelming evidence has demonstrated that judicial
review for the most part has not functioned as an anti-majoritarian practice." 5
Indeed, when courts exercise their power of judicial review they are most
frequently reviewing not acts of "majoritarian" legislatures but of relatively
low-level executive and administrative officials exercising discretion.236
Equally to the point, other research has shown Hand's "majoritarian" view of
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91
GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of an
Academic Obsession, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). For an interpretation placing the post-New Deal
debate in a broad intellectual context, see FELDMAN, supra note 29, at 349 50.
234. For a review of much of the literature on the extent to which the Court is "majoritarian,"
see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian " Institution?, 2010 Sup. CT. REV.
103, 103. For a sampling of the literature showing the Court's responsiveness to the other
branches of government, see, for example, GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS:
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 252 53 (2003)
(describing judicial lawmaking as frequently the result of congressional delegations of power);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 288 92 (2007) (noting
the Court follows presidential wing of dominant political party); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583,
585 (2001) (noting that the Court adjusts decisions in anticipation of responses of other branches);
Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003)
(showing the Court more likely to overturn a congressional statute when it was passed by earlier
Congress and current Congress is ideologically sympathetic with overruling); Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
35, 36 (noting the Court makes policy when legislature is stalemated or invites action); see also
TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 3 4 (2011); Neal Devins, Is Judicial
Policymaking Countermajoritarian?, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH
PERSPECTIVE (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds.) 189 201 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew D. Martin, Constitutional Interpretation from a Strategic Perspective, in MAKING
POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds.)170
88; Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stephanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme Court,
and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI.
89, 90 (2011); Alicia Uribe, James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, The Influence of
Congressional Preferences on Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Decisions, 48 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 921,922 25(2014).
235. In addition to the sources cited in note 234, supra, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN,
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367 71 (2009) (noting the Court commonly follows
public opinion); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The LeastDangerous Branch Revisited:
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019
(2004). For a general review of the literature, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2017).
236. BLACK, supra note 227, at 78, 89 90.
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
legislatures is highly flawed because state and federal legislatures quite
commonly represent narrow special interests-or the careerist interests of
their members-rather than "majoritarian" views.23  In many cases, then,
even judicial review of legislative acts is not, in reality, an anti-majoritarian
process. Indeed, when the Court invalidates legislative acts, its decisions are
often the result of a new political majority taking over the federal branches
and enforcing their new ostensibly majoritarian views on the nation and
states."8 Thus, today it is well established that judicial review is far more
subtle, varied, complex-and often even "majoritarian"-than The Bill of
Rights recognized.239 More than half a century of scholarship has superseded
Hand's simplistic treatment of the issue.
B. Personal and Subjective Values in The Bill of Rights
While time and context marked The Bill of Rights, many of its arguments
also revealed its deeply personal, subjective, and even idiosyncratic nature.
Hand went out of his way, for example, to discuss the dormant Commerce
Clause although he acknowledged that it was "not relevant to my subject.""24
The Court's embrace of the doctrine was "an extreme construction of the
237. See, e.g., DAVID S. SCHOENBROD, D.C. CONFIDENTIAL: INSIDE THE FIVE TRICKS OF
WASHINGTON 18 19 (2017). The federal structure, the practice of gerrymandering, and the
lobbying power of organized interest groups often prevent federal and state legislatures from
following "majoritarian" wishes. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 23 (1980) ("[B]y transmitting pertinent information to key lawmakers, by skillfully and
selectively applying pressure at critical points in the system, and by expanding massive sums of
money-not infrequently in an abusive, and occasionally criminal, manner [interest groups] are
able to exercise power well beyond the force of the numbers of people they represent."); LOVELL,
supra note 234, at 22 ("[T]hat legislative outcomes should serve as a paragon of democracy or a
proxy for the will of 'majorities' seems almost bizarre."); Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule:
Part I The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 290 91
(2016) (institutional and geographic factors often block majority rule); Thomas Stratmann, Can
Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L.
& ECON. 345, 368 (2002) ("The results in this paper support the hypothesis that interest groups
'buy' legislators' votes with PAC contributions."). For a qualification of the argument about the
anti-majoritarian nature of many legislatures, see ELY, supra note 42, at 181 83.
238. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating section of Voting
Rights Act of 1965); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state "poll
tax" law). See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 235.
239. Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense ofDifficulty, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 845, 889 92 (2001).
240. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 33; see also id. at 31 32 (The issue of the
dormant Commerce Clause "is irrelevant to the 'Bill of Rights,"' but it "so well discloses the kind
of media concludendi used in constitutional cases that it justifies a short digression.").
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
clause,"24 ' he explained, yet it was defensible on the ground that it was "not
altogether irrational.
242
Two points were apparent. One was that his judgment on the dormant
Commerce Clause reflected his own personal views, derived from his
Progressive association with both Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Croly,
"that a nationally integrated market was the constitutional ideal. '243 The other
was that he refused to judge Brown and its interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the same test.244 Hand based his justification of the dormant
Commerce Clause on practical considerations. It was necessary to overcome
state "rivalries" that could otherwise "strain the whole national fabric" and
impede the power of Congress to assert national authority.245 Given the
context of American race relations in 1958, he could have defended the
Court's efforts against racial segregation on those identical practical grounds,
and those grounds would surely have been constitutionally sufficient had he
judged them by the "not altogether irrational" test that he used to justify the
dormant Commerce Clause.
Hand's failure to apply the same test to both the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment was particularly noticeable because
he repeatedly insisted that there was no constitutional justification for treating
"personal" rights differently from "economic" rights.246 That proposition, he
asserted, also seemed "unanswerable. 24 Yet he sanctioned stricter judicial
supervision over "economic" issues under the dormant Commerce Clause
than he allowed for "personal" and "economic" rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although he did not adequately explain his grounds for making
that distinction, his reasoning suggested two possible arguments in support,
neither of which was persuasive.
One possible ground for the distinction was that the dormant Commerce
Clause, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, was a structural doctrine designed
to keep the levels and branches of government "within their prescribed
powers. ' 248 That ground was unconvincing, however, for two distinct
reasons. First, the dormant Commerce Clause was not a textually
241. Id. at 32.
242. Id. at 33. On the dormant Commerce Clause, Hand's Progressive view parted from
Thayer's position. See Gabin, supra note 85, at 980 83.
243. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 448.
244. For Hand's disagreement with Brown, see HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11,
at 54 55.
245. Id. at 33.
246. There was no constitutional basis "for asserting a larger measure of judicial supervision
over the first than over the second." Id. at 51.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 15.
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"prescribed" power; and, insofar as the clause itself conferred a prescribed
power, it was a power of Congress, not of the courts. The dormant commerce
power, moreover, required extended practical reasoning to support its
legitimacy, and that kind of reasoning could have equally supported stricter
judicial supervision under the Fourteenth Amendment over at least some
issues-racial segregation and disenfranchisement, for example-that
involved both "personal" and "economic" rights. Second, the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed substantial restraints on the states, and hence it was on
its face a structural component designed to limit "their prescribed powers."
In that sense the dormant commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment
were identical.
A second possible ground for his distinction was that the dormant
Commerce Clause met his test for allowable judicial review because it was
necessary to prevent the failure of the whole constitutional enterprise.249 Yet
that ground was equally unconvincing. First of all, in 1958 it was "not
altogether irrational" to think that racial strife and turmoil could also threaten
the whole constitutional enterprise. It had surely done so several times before,
once spectacularly and tragically. Second, and doctrinally more obvious, the
dormant Commerce Clause was not necessary to prevent such a possible
failure. Had state economic rivalries created problems threatening the
constitutional enterprise, Congress had ample power under the Commerce
Clause to intervene and end the threat by enacting any measure necessary to
accomplish its purpose. Indeed, such congressional action would have been
the kind of remedy that Hand-committed to "judicial restraint" and
deference to the legislature-should have hailed and readily limited himself
to defending. More pointedly, he should certainly have endorsed such
congressional action as far more appropriate than judicial intervention based
on the strained interpretation of a power granted only to another branch of
government."'
249. Compare id. at 14 15, 29 (describing the failure of enterprise standard), with id. at 32
33 (offering reasons supporting dormant Commerce Clause).
250. On this point, Hand seemed to abandon principles that he as well as Thayer had often
pronounced. Thayer had emphasized that one of the evils of judicial review was that it
discouraged legislatures and the people from taking responsibility for their own government.
Thayer, supra note 81, at 155 56.
If what I have been saying is true, the safe and permanent road towards reform
is that of impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they have of the
great range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must
leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power; so that




Whatever Hand's exact thinking on the point, his theoretical grounds for
distinguishing between judicial activism under the dormant Commerce
Clause and judicial activism under the Fourteenth Amendment were anything
but "unanswerable." Those grounds were personal, subjective, and
inconsistent with other elements of his own theory.
Equally significant, Hand's negative judgment on Brown was unjustified
and subjective given the constitutional standards he urged at various points
in his book. In a particularly striking comment, for example, he declared that
the provisions of the Bill of Rights were too vague to be enforced25' and that
they required "no more than that temper of detachment, impartiality, and an
absence of self-directed bias that is the whole content of justice." '252 As was
undeniable in 195 8, nothing in American life was infused with a more intense
and obvious "self-directed bias" than the Jim Crow laws and practices that
white governments imposed on blacks. Moreover, even if Hand intended to
refer only to "self-directed bias" on the part of judiciary, his argument was
still unjustified. The Justices who decided Plessy v. Ferguson, to which Hand
specifically referred,253 as well as the judges-including Justices on the
Supreme Court-who had repeatedly upheld abusive racist laws and actions
were all white men, many if not most of whom shared racist attitudes and
values.254 Their decisions were surely the products of "self-directed bias."
Similarly, Hand declared that he could see no reason "why courts should
intervene" under the Due Process Clause "unless it appears that the statutes
are not honest choices between values and sacrifices honestly appraised." '255
In the context of his dismissal of Brown and its foundation in the Equal
Protection Clause, the standards he prescribed for due process were
meaningless and, in context and effect, racially biased.256 If Southern
segregation laws constituted "honest choices between values," the "honesty"
standard he offered could impose no meaningful limit on any kind of abusive
lawmaking. If such laws were constitutional, the requirement of "sacrifices
honestly appraised" could have no determinate and substantive meaning.
Ironically, Hand had seemed to glimpse that fact sixteen years earlier. Then,
considering whether courts "might properly intervene" to check legislative
251. The Bill of Rights should be construed "as admonitory or hortatory" and "not definite
enough to be guides on concrete occasions." HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 34.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 54.
254. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay
on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts, " 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2010 28 (2003).
255. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 66.
256. He repeatedly invoked as standards "honest effort," and "impartial effort." Id. at 62, 67;
see also id at 61, 66.
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judgments, he had added a specific qualification. While such intervention
should not be allowed if the legislature "has honestly tried to appraise" the
conflicting values at stake, he explained, a legislature would have "failed"
that "honesty" test if its action was "nothing but the patent exploitation of one
group whose interests it has altogether disregarded." '25
Another standard Hand proposed was normatively incoherent. The
judiciary should refuse to void a statute, he announced, "unless the court is
satisfied that it was not the product of an effort impartially to balance the
conflicting values." '258 Yet, at the same time-and throughout his life-Hand
also insisted that "[v]alues and sacrifices are incommensurables. '259 By
definition, it is impossible to "balance" values that are "incommensurable."
Indeed, Hand himself admitted as much only a few years earlier when he
acknowledged that "I do not know how to weigh values against each other. 260
Yet another standard Hand proposed-the "underlying presuppositions of
popular government" 261-was inconsistent with his own theory. At the
beginning of his first lecture he announced that he based his reasoning about
the legitimacy ofjudicial review on the text of the Constitution and principles
of positivism. 26 2 The text of the Constitution, however, did not identify any
"underlying presuppositions of popular government" as such, nor did its
many relevant provisions adequately specify the content of such
"presuppositions. 263 Indeed, the constitutional provisions that did provide
257. HAND, Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 123. Similarly,
Southern racial laws would seem a clear exception to Hand's conviction that "it is very seldom
possible to say that a legislature has abdicated by surrendering to one faction; the relevant factors
are too many and too incomparable." Id. at 124.
258. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 61.
259. Id. at 38. Hand maintained that proposition repeatedly over the years. See, e.g., HAND,
Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, supra note 76, at 123; LEARNED HAND, To the Harvard
Alumni Association, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 85, 87; HAND, Sources of
Tolerance, supra note 72, at 55. In spite of his view that values were incommensurable, Hand
cherished his own deeply held values. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, A Plea for the Open Mind and
Free Discussion, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 208, 214 15; HAND, At Fourscore,
supra note 11, at 196 97; LEARNED HAND, At the Fiftieth Anniversary Commencement, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 133, 135; HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and
Realities, supra note 72, at 76 77.
260. LEARNED HAND, Morals in Public Life, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 11, at 170,
173. Further, his claim that values are "incommensurables" undermined his assertion about the
nature of "the whole content of justice." Compare id., with HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 34, 38.
261. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 73.
262. Id. at 2 3; see also id. at 27 29.
263. The Bill of Rights should be construed "as admonitory or hortatory" and "not definite
enough to be guides on concrete occasions." Id. at 34. Hand saw history as providing little or no
guidance. It "would be fatuous to attempt imaginatively to concoct how the Founding Fathers
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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some relatively specific content to those "presuppositions"-those in Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment-were precisely the provisions that
Hand claimed were too vague for judicial enforcement.264 On his own
textualist and positivist assumptions, then, his "underlying presuppositions
of popular government" lacked clear meaning and, more to the point, could
have no claim in theory to constitutionally authoritative status.
Indeed, the same may be said equally of his own theory ofjudicial review.
"I have been only trying to say," he explained, "what is the measure of
judicial intervention that can be thought to be implicit, though unexpressed,
in the Constitution." '265 On those same textualist and positivist grounds,
Hand's prescriptions for judicial review also lacked any claim to authoritative
status.
Even more striking was the contradiction in his self-proclaimed effort to
discover what was "implicit, though unexpressed, in the Constitution." Such
an effort was, after all, nothing but an attempt to develop the kind of
"structural" theory of judicial review that he had previously discarded as
without a "logical" foundation.266
Finally, the majoritarianism that Hand assumed as fundamental to his
"underlying presuppositions of popular government" was not the
comprehensive principle he tried to make it.26 Rather, for American
constitutional government, majoritarianism is but a partial and limited
principle. On its face the Constitution created a carefully structured and
highly restricted form of "popular government," mandating a range of
intervening institutions whose very purpose was to bar "the people" from
directly controlling their government.268  Thus, Hand's majoritarian
"presuppositions" could not support the sweeping implications he drew from
them, for majoritarianism was but one part of a complex structure of law and
government that filtered majority preferences through multiple mediating
institutions. His principle of majoritarianism was not adequate to resolve any
specific issue about the proper scope of judicial review.
would have applied [the provisions of the Bill of Rights] to the regulation of a modem society."
Id.
264. Id. at 33 42.
265. Id. at 67.
266. Id. at 15.
267. Id. at 73. The "ever present problem in all popular government," Hand wrote, was "how
far the will of immediate majorities should prevail." Id. at 69 70.
268. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 10 12 (2014). In addition to the principle of representation, the federal structure,
the Senate, and the Electoral College all demonstrate the limited nature of American "popular
government." The Article III federal judiciary and its power ofjudicial review arguably constitute
merely another example of the Constitution's limitations on "popular government."
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In sum, then, The Bill ofRights was embedded in a particular time, context,
and individual mind, and it was profoundly personal, subjective, and in places
self-contradictory. Its pose of "timelessness" was a facade, and the
"unanswerable" propositions it proclaimed were little more than dubious
opinions expressed at a particular time and in a particular context by a single
distinctive individual. Hand's goal of producing "logically airtight
arguments" did not mask the fact that his reasoning and judgments flowed
from his own personal views, not from the text of the Constitution,
authoritative "presuppositions of popular government," or some pure and
eternal commitment to extreme judicial deference.
Ironically, Hand acknowledged as much in his oft-quoted conclusion.
"Each one of us," he declared, "must in the end choose for himself how far
he would like to leave our collective fate to the wayward vagaries of popular
assemblies."269 Then, he offered a personal confession. "For myself it would
be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew
how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."270
The ultimate constitutional choice Hand identified between "wayward"
legislatures and "Platonic Guardians" illustrated with striking clarity how his
thinking had ossified. In his valedictory's summation, he could discern only
one binary choice between almost cartoon-like extremes. It was a sterile
vision that missed entirely the elastic, dynamic, malleable, counterbalancing,
and culturally embedded nature of American constitutionalism. 271 The choice
the Constitution presents is not stark; it is not unchanging; and it is not an
"either/or" matter. Such a false and arbitrary choice is simply irrelevant to
American constitutionalism whose essential challenge is to continually find
effective and popularly acceptable ways to balance the inherent tensions the
Constitution establishes in both the checking structures it creates and the
conflicting values it enshrines. 2 That is precisely the ultimate constitutional
challenge, and The Bill of Rights failed even to recognize its nature. 273
269. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 73.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 220, at 189 206; Robert C. Post, Foreward: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 82 (2003).
272. As Alexander Bickel wisely noted, American constitutional government is "a working
system, and stable, but in tension. It is the tension that interests me." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT, at x (1965).
273. Gunther combined a fair point with an overly sympathetic whitewash when he
concluded his treatment of The Bill ofRights. GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 671 72.
Ultimately, the bleakness, pessimism, and extremism of Hand's final major
statement did not do full justice to the richness, subtlety, and complexity of his




Although there are many reasons why Hand's constitutional jurisprudence
has been important, its strongest claim to enduring significance rests on the
ways it helps illuminate the fundamental characteristics and challenges of
American constitutional government. In spite of Hand's purported
consistency over the years and the ostensibly "timeless" nature of his
constitutional claims, an examination of his thinking reveals the pervasive, if
often subtle and uncertain, shaping power of historical context, social change,
and personal values.
Recognition of that fact, in turn, suggests that every constitutional
theory-however logical and ostensibly timeless it may appear-is also the
product of both specific historical conditions and the individual views,
values, and goals of its proponent. That recognition suggests that no
constitutional theory has a claim to "timeless" correctness and that none can
be fully and properly evaluated without placing it firmly in its time and
place.2"4 The Hand of The Bill of Rights has no more claim to "timeless"
correctness than does the Hand of The Speech of Justice.
In American constitutionalism judgment is all, and exacting historical
analysis is essential to understand the former and cultivate the latter.2"5
passionate devotion to free speech in an open society on the one side and
sensitivity to the legitimate restraints on courts in a democracy on the other.
Id. at 672. Hand's book certainly did not "do full justice" to the overall quality of his "lifelong
search" for an understanding of the judicial process, but it did far worse than merely fail to "do
full justice" to his thinking about the importance of free speech in a democracy.
274. "A theory framed with one generation's problems in mind can have continuing vitality
for another's." Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 695, 696 (2004). That statement is surely both true and important, and this essay does not
minimize the value of the insights and arguments that innumerable constitutional theorists and
commentators have developed over the centuries. It merely stresses the equal importance of
understanding those insights and arguments in their specific historical contexts and the value of
such understanding in the disciplined effort to apply the Constitution to the ever-new challenges
that the nation confronts.
275. See, e.g., Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169
(1987) ("[H]ow we are able to constitute ourselves [through our constitutional system and its
practice] is profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by our own distinctive history.").
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